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Abstract
We present evidence on whether and how a household’s behavior is inﬂuenced by the
presence and characteristics of its extended family. Using data from the PROGRESA
program in Mexico, we exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of
heads and spouses in conjunction with the Spanish naming convention to identify the inter
and intra generational family links of each household to others in the same village. We
then exploit the randomized research design of the PROGRESA evaluation data to identify
whether the treatment eﬀects of PROGRESA transfers on secondary school enrolment
vary according to the characteristics of extended family. We ﬁnd PROGRESA only raises
secondary enrolment among households that are embedded in a family network. Eligible
but isolated households do not respond. The mechanism through which the extended
family inﬂuences household schooling choices is the redistribution of resources within
the family network from eligibles that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers from
PROGRESA, towards eligibles on the margin of enrolling children into secondary school.
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11 Introduction
Economists usually focus on the nuclear family as the unit of analysis from which to study
household behavior. Indeed, standard models of household decision making, such as the unitary
model [Becker 1981], bargaining models [Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981],
and collective choice models [Chiappori 1988] all emphasize the preferences and resources of
household members in shaping outcomes. Moreover, it is typically not possible to empirically
identify the precise familial ties between households in survey data.
However, every household is actually embedded within an extended family network. If
extended families shape the objectives and constraints relevant for households within them,
then neglecting the role of this network leads to an incomplete understanding of household
behaviors. The extended family may be especially relevant for household behavior in economic
environments characterized by missing markets, correlated shocks, informal institutions of con-
tract enforcement, and large scale policy interventions that aﬀect many households in the local
economy.
All these features apply to the empirical context of this paper, which uses household panel
data from the PROGRESA social assistance program in rural Mexico. PROGRESA provides
cash transfers to households conditional on their childrens’ school attendance. In this paper
we ﬁrst exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of heads and spouses in
conjunction with the Spanish naming convention in Mexico to identify the inter and intra gener-
ational family links of each household to others in the village. We then exploit the randomized
design of the PROGRESA evaluation data to identify whether the treatment eﬀects of PRO-
GRESA transfers on school enrolment vary according to the presence and characteristics of
extended family members.
Two key intuitions underlie our analysis. First, PROGRESA exogenously shifts the re-
sources available to individual households and to their family network as a whole. Second,
families are able to enforce implicit contracts of resource sharing. Hence PROGRESA can
induce diﬀerential responses between connected households — namely those embedded within
family networks, and those that are socially isolated in the sense that none of their extended
family live in close proximity and are not therefore subject to the change in resources that
PROGRESA provides.1
While undoubtedly other households outside the extended family network also inﬂuence
behavior, there are good reasons to focus on family networks, rather than friendship networks
say, as being the core group within which resources are shared. First, evolutionary biology
1Our analysis relates to the literature on risk pooling arrangements across households. While such ex post risk
pooling mechanisms have been documented in developing country settings, formal tests of the Pareto eﬃcient
allocation of risk being achieved at the village level are typically rejected [Townsend 1994, Ligon 1998, Dercon
and Krishnan 2000]. There is stronger evidence of risk pooling within ethnic groups [Deaton 1992, Udry 1994],
sub-castes [Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005, Mazzocco and Saini 2009], and family and friends [Rosenzweig 1988,
Fafchamps and Lund 2003, La Ferrara 2003, Cox and Fafchamps 2007].
2suggests preferences are deﬁned over the family dynasty, as is commonly modelled within an
overlapping generations framework. Moreover there are speciﬁc inter-generational investments —
such as those into children’s education — that have no counterpart in friendship ties, and provide
long run incentives for family members to reciprocate in resource sharing arrangements. Finally,
the transactions costs of sharing resources with non-family members may be higher because it
is both more costly to observe outcomes outside the family network, and fewer mechanisms
exist by which to punish non-family members that renege on such arrangements [La Ferrara
2003].2
We exploit three key data features. First, we combine information on the paternal and
maternal surnames of household heads and their spouses, with the Spanish naming convention
to build two types of extended family link within the same village — (i) inter-generational links,
such as those from the head and spouse to their parents, and to their adult sons and daughters;
(ii) intra-generational links, such as those from the head and spouse to their brothers and sis-
ters. Combined with information from household rosters that identify extended family members
that co-reside in the household, this provides an almost complete mapping of extended family
structures across 506 villages, covering around 22,000 households and over 130,000 individu-
als. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time such a large scale mapping has been
conducted.
Second, we exploit the multiple components of PROGRESA, each of which provides cash
transfers conditional on a diﬀerent household behavior. One component provides cash transfers
conditional on the attendance of children in primary and secondary school. However, as pre-
program initiation primary school enrolment rates are above 90%, transfers provided for this
purpose represent a de facto unconditional cash transfer for households with primary school
aged children. In contrast pre-program secondary enrolment rates are 65% so that for many
households cash transfers will be obtained only if a change in behavior is induced. This is
important because the value of transfers only corresponds to between one half to two thirds of
the full time child wage in the survey villages [Schultz 2004], and so do not fully compensate
for foregone earnings of secondary school aged children employed full time in the labor market.
Hence if households are credit constrained, PROGRESA’s eﬀect on secondary enrolment
may be a function of the presence of primary school aged children, who receive de facto un-
conditional transfers. In particular, households can use these transfers to supplement those
speciﬁcally conditioned on secondary school enrolment, thus fully oﬀsetting the opportunity
costs of enrolling children into full time secondary school. This channel aﬀects both connected
and isolated households. In addition, if families share resources, and in particular they share
the unconditional transfers obtained from the primary school component of PROGRESA, the
2We therefore also contribute to the literature on the eﬀects of extended family on household behavior, such
as for consumption [Altonji et al 1992]; inter-generational transfers [Cox and Jakubson 1995, Altonji et al 1997,
La Ferrara 2003, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2006]; childrens’ education choices [Loury 2006]; and non-resident
parental investments into children [Weiss and Willis 1985].
3response of connected households will also depend on the demographic composition of eligible
households within their family network. This drives a wedge between the program responses of
connected and isolated households in terms of secondary enrolment.
Third, we exploit the randomized research design used to evaluate PROGRESA. Of the 506
sampled villages, 320 were randomly assigned to be a treatment group, namely villages where
PROGRESA would be implemented, and 186 villages were controls. Data was collected on a
panel of around 22,000 households every six months over the pre and post-program initiation
periods. In each village the baseline survey provides a complete census of all eligible and all
non-eligible households. Under standard assumptions this research design identiﬁes the average
treatment eﬀect of PROGRESA from a comparison of eligibles in treatment and control villages.
The core of our analysis identiﬁes whether this treatment eﬀect varies across connected and
isolated households.
Our main descriptive ﬁndings are as follows. First, 20% of couple headed households are
isolated in the sense that none of their extended family reside within the village, while 80% are
embedded within an extended family network. As a point of comparison, we note that 15% of
households are single headed. Second, there are no signiﬁcant pre-program diﬀerences between
isolated and connected households in terms of their primary and secondary enrolment rates,
and overall poverty levels. Third, among connected households, the extended family of the
head is more likely to reside in the same village than the extended family of his spouse, and
this relates to higher levels of female migration at the time of marriage.3
Our main empirical ﬁndings are as follows. First, despite baseline enrolment rates being
similar in connected and isolated households, only connected households respond to the program
in terms of secondary school enrolment. The average treatment eﬀect of PROGRESA on them
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at around 9%. In contrast, eligible but isolated households
do not respond — their treatment eﬀect varies between -.2% and .9% and is never signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.4
Our second set of results provides direct evidence on the interplay between the design
features of PROGRESA, whether a household is connected or isolated, and its response to the
program. In particular, we ﬁnd that the marginal response of connected households in terms of
secondary enrolment depends on the demographic composition of their own household, and the
demographic composition of eligible households within their extended family. The particular
pattern of responses we document, that are a function of primary school aged children both
in the household and the eligible portion of the extended family network as a whole, point
to resources being redistributed within family networks towards households that are on the
margin of enrolling children into secondary school. These are those households that themselves
3This is similar to the ﬁndings of Rosenzweig and Stark [1989] who examine marital arrangements in rural
India.
4We build on earlier ﬁndings on the eﬀects of PROGRESA on enrolment [Schultz 2004, Attanasio et al 2005,
Todd and Wolpin 2006]. This literature has not emphasized the inﬂuence of extended families on schooling
choices.
4receive eﬀectively unconditional PROGRESA transfers for the primary school enrolment of their
children.
Finally, we complement our main results by considering which speciﬁc family members
share resources and why. Among sibling links, the household’s response to PROGRESA in
terms of secondary school enrolment is sensitive to the eligibility status of their siblings, and in
particular, whether eligible siblings obtain unconditional transfers from having primary school
aged children. Among parent-adult child links, parental households are again sensitive to the
eligibility status of their adult children and the presence of younger children in their households.
These results together, on the inﬂuence of speciﬁc family links, consistently point to re-
sources being redistributed within the network from eligibles that receive largely unconditional
transfers for the primary school enrolment of their children, towards eligibles that are on the
margin of enrolling children into secondary school. The pattern of results also helps rule out
other mechanisms behind why family networks matter in this setting, such as information shar-
ing or providing access to communal land. This is because if families mattered through these
other channels, we would not expect household responses to PROGRESA in terms of secondary
school enrolment to depend on the extent to which other households in the family network were
eligible, or the extent to which these eligible households received transfers speciﬁc to their
primary school aged children.
Although our analysis exploits the particular design features of PROGRESA, the results
have far wider implications. The descriptive analysis presents new evidence on the nature of
extended family structures. This can serve as a foundation for future work on understanding
behavior in the markets for marriage, and insurance, for example. The econometric evidence
highlights how the design of welfare programs in developing countries cannot be done in isolation
from an understanding of behavior within extended family networks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the PROGRESA program and data.
Section 3 discusses how we construct family links and provides descriptive evidence on them.
Section 4 presents the empirical method and supportive evidence on the underlying identifying
assumptions. Section 5 presents our baseline results on whether and why being connected
inﬂuences program responses. Section 6 presents evidence on how speciﬁc family links shape
schooling decisions. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of our
analysis. Additional results and robustness checks are in the Appendix.
2 The PROGRESA Program and Evaluation Data
2.1 Transfers
PROGRESA is an ongoing publicly funded social assistance program in Mexico. It is de-
signed to alleviate poverty by fostering human capital accumulation through two channels — (i)
the provision of cash transfers to households conditional on children’s attendance in primary
5and secondary school grades; (ii) the provision of cash transfers and nutritional supplements
conditional on attendance at local health facilities. This component of PROGRESA targets
households with pregnant or lactating women, and with children aged less than ﬁve.5
Central to the analysis in this paper is that the extended family members of any given
household can be eligible for transfers even if they have no secondary school age children. For
example, households with primary aged children, very young children and those with no children
but a pregnant women in them, can be eligible for the primary school, health, and nutritional
components respectively. Hence if families share resources, the response to PROGRESA of
households with secondary school age children will be partly determined by the demographic
composition of all eligible family members, not just those that also have secondary school aged
children.
Transfers for school enrolment are paid bimonthly and conditional on the child attending
classes at least 85% of the previous 60 days. Transfers are larger for higher school grades,
and for girls within any given grade. The average monthly transfer to eligible households is
non-negligible, corresponding to 20% of the value of monthly consumption expenditures pre-
program [Skouﬁas 2005].6 However, the value of transfers only corresponds to between one half
to two thirds of the full time child wage in the survey villages [Schultz 2004]. Hence the most
credit constrained households should not be induced to change their schooling choices by such
transfers alone.
Although both the education and health components are conditioned on household behav-
ior, the extent to which households need to change behavior to obtain the transfers depends
on their pre-program choices. As documented in Section 4, pre-program primary enrolment
rates are above 90%. Hence transfers provided to enrol children into primary school eﬀectively
represent a pure income eﬀect on households. In contrast pre-program secondary enrolment
rates are closer to 65%. Hence given the value of transfers conditional on secondary enrolment
do not compensate for the loss of income earned by children in the labor market, the likelihood
the program increases secondary enrolment rates will depend partly on the demographic com-
position of children in the household. In addition, if families share resources, the response of
connected households will in general depend on the demographic composition of eligible house-
holds within their entire family network. This channel drives a wedge between the behavioral
responses of connected and isolated households to the program in terms of the secondary school
enrolment.
5The program was initially oﬀered to 140,544 households in 1997, expanding to more than 2.6 million recipient
households throughout rural Mexico by the end of 1999. This constitutes around 40% of all rural families and
one ninth of all families in Mexico. The total annual budget of the program in 1999 was equivalent to just under
20% of the federal poverty alleviation budget or .2% of GDP [Skouﬁas 2005]. The program was expanded to
urban areas in 2003 under the name of Oportunidades. We do not exploit this expansion into urban areas for
our analysis primarily because we do not have access to information on surnames in that data.
6By November 1999 the bimonthly transfer ranged from 160 pesos for third grade, to 530 (610) pesos for
boys (girls) in ninth grade. The total amount received bimonthly by a household cannot however exceed 1500
pesos.
6Of course, some portion of the transfers received for secondary school enrolment may also
be viewed as de facto unconditional cash transfers that can be redistributed within the family
if a household has a fraction of its children of secondary school age enrolled when PROGRESA
is initiated. However, as discussed in Section 6, because the majority of households tend to
have either none or all of their children enrolled in secondary school, there are far fewer such
households than those that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers related to their primary
school aged children.7
Finally, the health and nutrition components of the program require the periodic attendance
of mothers at local health clinics. Households are likely to view this component as somewhere
between the purely unconditional transfers obtained for primary schooling, and the conditional
transfers obtained for secondary schooling. Again it will be the case that the response in terms
of secondary school enrolment will in general be inﬂuenced by the presence of young children in
the household to whom this component is targeted, and for connected households, the presence
of young children in eligible households within the family network as a whole.8
2.2 Eligibility and The Evaluation Data
In 1997 households were classiﬁed as either being eligible (poor) or non-eligible (not poor)
for PROGRESA transfers according to a household poverty index. This index is a weighted
average of household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock,
education, and other physical characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give
relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than current income.
Around half the households were classiﬁed as poor and therefore eligible for PROGRESA.
Households were informed that their eligibility status would not change at least until November
1999, irrespective of any variation in household income. Moreover, the monetary value of
transfers that eligibles were entitled to was determined by the age and gender composition
of the children resident in the household at baseline. There are therefore no incentives for
eligibles to foster children from non-eligibles with the aim of obtaining more transfers. Finally,
a distinguishing feature of PROGRESA is that households were clearly informed about the
program’s introduction through village-wide assembly meetings. These meetings also ensured
households agreed with their designated eligibility status. Hence take-up rates for at least one
7More generally, PROGRESA might aﬀect school enrolment through a variety of margins - (i) it enables
children to enrol when they otherwise would not have received any schooling; (ii) it allows them to acquire more
years of schooling than they would in the absence of the program; (iii) it allows them to transit from primary
to secondary; (iv) it enables them to come back to school having dropped out. Some of the earlier papers have
examined these separate channels. The extent to which PROGRESA aﬀects enrolment through one channel
or another aﬀects the extent to which the grant is viewed as de facto because some of these channels imply a
change in enrolment status needs to be observed for the additional resources to ﬂow into the household.
8The required frequency of attendance varies depending on age — children younger than 4 months are required
to attend three check ups, those aged 4 to 24 months attend 8 check ups, those aged 2 to 4 attend every 4
months, those aged 5 to 16 attend every six months, pregnant women attend ﬁve check ups during their prenatal
period, lactating women attend two check ups, and adults are required to attend annual check ups [Skouﬁas
2005].
7component of the program among eligibles are over 90% and we do not therefore distinguish
between intent-to-treat and treatment eﬀects.9
To evaluate PROGRESA, an experimental research design was implemented and household
data collected on a panel of around 22,000 households every six months in 506 villages between
March 1998 and November 1999.10 Of the 506 villages, 320 were randomly assigned to the
treatment group, namely locations where PROGRESA would be later implemented in May
1998, and 186 villages were assigned to be control villages. The ﬁrst two waves were collected
pre-program (October 1997, March 1998). Transfers were ﬁrst distributed in May 1998, hence
the remaining waves (October 1998, May 1999, November 1999) correspond to the post-program
initiation period. To understand whether household behavior is inﬂuenced by the characteristics
of extended family members of both the head and spouse, we focus attention on the 85% of
households that are couple headed throughout.11
3 Constructing Extended Family Links
3.1 Surnames and the Matching Algorithm
To identify both the intra-generational and the inter-generational family links between any two
households in the same village we exploit information on surnames provided in the third wave
of data, and in conjunction with the naming convention in Mexico.12
Mexicans use two surnames — the ﬁrst is inherited from the father’s paternal lineage and
the second from the mother’s paternal lineage. For example, former Mexican president Vicente
9A group of households — referred to as densiﬁcados — had their eligibility status reclassiﬁed from non-
eligible to eligible in October 1998. A non-random subset of them began receiving PROGRESA transfers in
treatment villages prior to November 1999. As no precise algorithm exists to determine which densiﬁcados
received transfers in treatment villages, no counterfactual set of households exists for them in control villages.
As we can deﬁne extended family links to and from these households, all the reported descriptive statistics
on extended families include links to and from densiﬁcados. We do not consider changes in enrolment among
densiﬁcados in our analysis.
10Villages were selected on the basis of a marginality index constructed from information on the share of
illiterate adults in the village; share of dwellings without water, drainage systems, electricity, and with ﬂoors of
dirt; average number of occupants per room in village households; share of population working in the primary
sector; distance from other villages, and health and school infrastructures in the village.
11Control villages began receiving PROGRESA transfers in December 1999. In 1997, eligible households in
control villages were informed they would become part of the program at the end of 1999 conditional on them
still being eligible and the program continuing.
12Two concerns arise from the surnames data being measured in the ﬁrst wave of post-program data. First,
households may endogenously respond to the program by changing household structures, in particular, by
artiﬁcially forming new households in order to increase the number of eligibles in the family. This concern is
ameliorated by the fact that the register of eligible households was drawn up at baseline, and only households
recorded to be eligible at that point were later entitled to receive transfers. Moreover, although there is an
increase in the number of households from the baseline to October 1998, this increase is proportionately the
same in both treatment and control villages. A second concern is that the program may aﬀect the migration
of the household head or of his spouse. However, only .4% (.5%) of households in wave 3 (5) report having a
migrant head or spouse. Moreover the share of households with such migrants does not diﬀer across treatment
and control villages.
8Fox Quesada would be identiﬁed by his given name (Vicente), his father’s paternal name (Fox)
and his mother’s paternal name (Quesada). In the evaluation data, respondents were asked
to provide the — (i) given name; (ii) paternal surname; and, (iii) maternal surname, for each
household member. Hence couple headed households have four associated surnames — the
paternal and maternal surnames of the head, and the paternal and maternal surnames of his
wife.13
Figure 1 illustrates the matching algorithm. To deﬁne each family link, we use information
on two of the four surnames. Consider household A at the root of the family tree. The head
of the household has paternal and maternal surnames F1 and f1 respectively. His wife has
paternal and maternal surnames F2 and f2 respectively.14
The children of the couple in household A will adopt the paternal surnames of their fa-
ther (F1) and mother (F2). Hence we deﬁne there to be a parent-son relationship between
households A and B if — (i) the paternal surname of the head in household B is the same
as the paternal surname of the head in household A (F1); and, (ii) the maternal surname
of the head in household B is the same as the paternal surname of the spouse in household
A (F2). Parent-daughter relationships can be similarly deﬁned. Moreover, intra-generational
family ties between siblings can also be identiﬁed. For example, the heads of households B and
C are identiﬁed to be brothers if they share the same paternal and maternal surnames.
Figure 1 shows all households to be couple headed solely to ease the exposition. To deal
with the 15% of households that are single headed we use information on the gender of the head
to accurately deﬁne family links. Finally, we impose the following restrictions when deﬁning
family links — (i) inter-generational links exist when the relevant individuals have at least 15
years age diﬀerence, and no more than 60 years age diﬀerence between mother and child; (ii)
intra-generational links exist when the individuals have at most 30 years age diﬀerence.
However, there are limits to which information on surnames can be used to construct family
ties. Consider links from household i to a single headed household j. As Figure 1 shows, the
fact that household j is single headed does not aﬀect the construction of links from the head
and spouse of household i either to their children or to their siblings. However, links from the
head (spouse) of household i to the household of his (her) parents can only be identiﬁed if both
13The precise wording of the question in Spanish is, “Dígame por favor el nombre completo con todo y apellidos
de todas las personas que viven en este hogar, empezando por (jefe del hogar) — (i) nombre; (ii) apellido paterno;
(iii) apellido materno”. We cleaned the surnames data as follows — (i) we removed non-alphabetical characters,
replaced “Sin Apellido” (no surname) with missing values, and corrected some obvious typos based on intra-
household surname checks; (ii) we imputed a small number of missing female surnames from wave 2; (iii) we
veriﬁed surnames using the same information from wave 5, and veriﬁed the relationship to the household head
using wave 1 data. No information on surnames is available in the ﬁrst wave of data. The head of household is
originally deﬁned to be the main income earner. In a very small number of cases the head of a couple headed
household is reported to be a women. To keep clear the exposition, we redeﬁne the head to be male in such
cases.
14Paternal (maternal) surnames are indicated in upper (lower) case. First names are not shown as they are
irrelevant for the matching algorithm. In Anglo Saxon countries, F1 corresponds to the family name and F2
corresponds to the spouse’s maiden name.
9his (her) parents are alive and resident together. This is because this particular family link is
identiﬁed using information from household j on the paternal surnames of both the head and
spouse.15
We deﬁne family links within villages because PROGRESA is implemented at the village
level. Hence geographically proximate family members are those most relevant to understand
household behavior if families share resources. Isolated households may well have extended
family elsewhere and share resources with them, but their family is unlikely to experience any
resource changes due to PROGRESA because the data covers a period when the program was
still being rolled out.
The Appendix provides more descriptive evidence on surnames in this setting, and dis-
cusses various forms of measurement error in the family links, some of which can be quantiﬁed.
However, it is important to note that sources of measurement error that imply households are
incorrectly labelled as connected when in fact they are isolated makes it less likely that any
behavioral diﬀerences are found between households deﬁned to be connected and isolated. In
addition, the econometric analysis only exploits information on whether such family links exist
for a household, not the number of such links. We also show the robustness of our main results
to dropping households with potential measurement error in their surnames, and to limiting the
sample to smaller villages where spurious links between households are less likely to be deﬁned.
3.2 The Number of Extended Family Links
Table 1 shows the number of family links each household has to others in the village. The
columns of the upper panel split family links into — (i) inter-generational links to parents and
adult children who head their own households; (ii) intra-generational links to siblings who head
their own households. We report each type of link from the head and spouse separately. The
lower panel reports the number of corresponding family links that co-reside inside the household
as measured from the household roster in wave 3. Using information on the relationship to the
household head, we decompose these links into those from the head and spouse. Each type
of link is reported separately for connected and isolated households. By deﬁnition, the upper
panel reports that isolated households have no links to family members within the same village.
On links to extended family, Table 1 shows parents are many times more likely to reside
outside rather than inside the household of their adult children. The number of parents present
is higher for the head than for his spouse, and this is true for parents inside and outside the
household. This is consistent with either the spouse migrating to the village, or women moving
in with their husband’s family within the same village. To shed more light on this we exploit
data on spouse’s marital history. Wives were asked about where they went to live after marriage
— 49.3% stated that they went to live with their in-laws after marriage, and only 6.5% report
15However this is unlikely to be a major issue. For example we note that female widows aged above 40 are
37% more likely to live as a dependent within a household, rather than head their own household, relative to a
similar married woman. These single parents are then recorded in the household roster.
10living with their own parents. The key diﬀerence between spouses with and without parents
resident in the village is that 85% of spouses that have their parents present in the village
report remaining in the same village at the time of marriage. The ﬁgure for spouses that
have no parental links in the village is only 61%. Along other margins, women in connected
households with and without parents in the village are similar. For example, they do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in their ages at marriage, nor in the proportions that report their in-laws originally
proposing the marriage (56%).
The number of links to adult children are, by construction, identical for head and spouse.
Given respondents’ ages, there are many more young children inside than adult children outside
the household. Sibling links are more likely to be outside the household, which is as expected
given respondents’ ages. Heads have more siblings links than their spouses, and this is again
true for links both inside and outside the household. Overall, the upper panel shows that the
average household has family ties to just over ﬁve other households in the same village, and
that the majority of these family links are those of male heads of household.16
A concern is that isolated households may simply be those in which all family members reside
under the same roof. The lower panel of Table 1 shows this is not true — the average household
has around seven members and this is not diﬀerent between connected and isolated households.
Another explanation for why isolated households exist relates to geographic mobility. On this
issue we note that while isolated and connected households are equally likely to report being
resident in the same state of birth, unfortunately, the data does not contain information on how
long individuals have been resident in the same village. However, we note that among isolated
households, only 52% of spouses report living in same village as at the time of marriage, which
is lower than that for spouses in connected households as reported above.17,18
Finally, we note that connected and isolated households are as likely to report receiving
remittances from family members that have permanently migrated away in the ﬁve years prior
to baseline. Hence isolated households do have family located somewhere, and may share
resources with them.19 The key diﬀerence for our analysis is that their families are far less
16In October 1998 the average age of heads (spouses) among couple headed households is 45.0 (40.5). The
total number of siblings of the head is on average 2.23, implying his parents have 3.23 children that reside within
the same village. In contrast, heads have on average 4.70 of their own children somewhere in the village. Again
this is as expected given that siblings are older than adult children and so will be more likely to have migrated.
17We also explored whether the number of links is predicted by the number of family members residing under
the same roof. The unconditional correlation between the two is .019 for the couple headed households with
secondary school aged children that we use for our main analysis. We then regressed the number of links on
household size and other basic demographic and house hold controls as well as village ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd the
coeﬃcient on household size is .029 with standard error of .026. Hence the number of family members inside
the household is not a robust predictor of family members outside the household.
18Munshi and Rosenzweig [2005] provide evidence from India that those who migrate away from their sub-
caste lose the services of that network, including mutual insurance arrangements. The model they develop and
test implies the wealthiest households are those with incentives to withdraw from such arrangements. However,
in general, the relationship between wealth and exit is theoretically ambiguous [Banerjee and Newman 1998].
19There is however no information on pre-program transfers from other family members outside the village,
including temporary migrants or family members in the place of birth if the household has itself migrated.
Hence it is not possible to make inferences about whether the transactions costs of across village transfers are
11likely to receive PROGRESA resources since they live in diﬀerent villages, and the program is
being scaled up during the period of study. This drives a wedge between the program response
of isolated and connected households, even if all families share resources.20
To provide external validity to the links, the Appendix presents similar information from the
Mexican Family Life Survey, that was collected in rural areas over a comparable time period.
3.3 Family Networks
Table 2 shows how the probability of having an extended family link of type-j varies by eligibility
across treatment and control villages. We ﬁrst note that 20% of couple headed households are
isolated. The incidence of not having extended family members geographically proximate in
the same village is therefore at least as high as the incidence of single headedness, which aﬀects
15% of households. We also see that links from the head are signiﬁcantly more likely to exist
than links from his spouse, and that intra-generational links are signiﬁcantly more common
than inter-generational links. These patterns hold for eligibles and non-eligibles in treatment
and control villages. Reassuringly, in nearly all cases there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the extended family links of eligibles and non-eligibles between treatment and control villages,
which as explained in Section 4, relates to an underlying identifying assumption for the empirical
analysis.21
Table 3 provides descriptive evidence on family network characteristics as a whole, by treat-
ment and control villages. There are 1379 (817) family networks in treatment (control) villages
covering 10559 (6471) households. In treatment villages, the ﬁrst column shows that on av-
erage there are around 7.6 households in each family. The average village has around seven
family dynasties so each dynasty encompasses 16% of all village households. The third column
provides information on the diameter of the network — the largest distance between any two
households in the network. This is around 2.4, implying family networks are unlikely to span
more than three generations.
The remaining columns document how family networks vary. We consider characteristics
that relate speciﬁcally to design features of PROGRESA that we exploit empirically. Networks
span eligibility status — there are an almost equal number of eligibles and non-eligibles in the
average family. Hence there is considerable scope for PROGRESA transfers to be redistributed
within the family. Family networks also vary in the share of households within them that
have primary and secondary school aged children. Hence, as shown in the ﬁnal column, the
higher than within village transfers, due to asymmetric information say.
20In a companion paper using the same data [Angelucci et al 2009], we focus on how the structure of family
networks is aﬀected by the characteristics of the village economy. We ﬁnd that family networks are larger (both
in the number of members and as a share of the village population) the poorer and the less unequal the village
of residence. We also present evidence on how these features of the local economy correlate to two decisions
that determine the long term network structure — the decision to migrate, and fertility choices.
21The one exception is the proportion of non-eligibles with links from the spouse to her brother being signif-
icantly higher in controls. Our later analysis however focuses on the inﬂuence of same gender siblings.
12potential value of transfers each household is eligible for and hence the amount of resources
to be redistributed within the family, varies considerably between networks. Finally, Table 3
also decomposes the variation in each statistic into that arising between family networks across
diﬀerent villages, and across family networks within the same village. There is typically more
variation within networks in the same village than across villages. This is important given that
identiﬁcation arises from across village comparisons of households with a given set of family
characteristics.
4 Empirical Method
4.1 Descriptive Evidence
The empirical analysis estimates the response of eligibles to PROGRESA in terms of secondary
enrolment rates, and explores whether these responses vary depending on the presence and
characteristics of extended family members. To begin with, we denote the secondary enrolment
rate of household h in village v in survey wave t as Yhvt. This is deﬁned as the fraction of
children aged between 11 and 16 resident in the household that are enrolled in school on survey
day in wave t. The behavioral response we focus on is the change in secondary enrolment
within the same household over time, between November 1999 (wave 5) and October 1997
(wave 1), denoted ∆Yhvt. This corresponds to more than one academic year after PROGRESA
is implemented.22
The left hand panel in Table 4 provides descriptive evidence on the pre-program levels
of secondary school enrolment rates, and how they vary over time in treatment and control
villages by eligibility status. While enrolment rates among eligibles at baseline are similar
across treatment and control villages, by November 1999 eligibles in treatment villages have
6.9% higher enrolment rates than eligibles in control villages. This DD is positive and signiﬁcant
for both boys and girls enrolment, and consistent with previous studies, the proportionate
increase is greater for girls.23
The central panel of Table 4 splits the sample between connected and isolated households.
This reveals that eligible isolated and connected households have similar baseline levels of
enrolment, implying that determinants of the levels of enrolment — such as credit constraints,
information on the costs and beneﬁts of schooling, or demand for child labor in the home —
do not, on average, explain baseline diﬀerences in the schooling choices between isolated and
22The enrolment rate is constructed from individual child observations that have complete information on
the child’s age, gender, and residence. Waves 1 and 5 are collected during the school year which runs from
September to July. This eases concerns that households mis-report enrolment status either because children
are on school vacation or have dropped out part way through the academic year. We later also use primary
enrolment rates for some of the analysis — these are analogously deﬁned for 6 to 10 year olds.
23Recall that the program design is such that households have no incentives to foster children in order to
obtain greater transfers. Indeed, we note these changes in enrolment are driven by changes in the number of
children enrolled in school, and not by the number of children resident in the household.
13connected households. Hence isolated households are at least as well oﬀ — in terms of secondary
enrolment — as connected households, and should not therefore be viewed as more vulnerable.
This idea is reinforced by the fact that isolated and connected households do not diﬀer in their
poverty index at baseline, a measure of permanent income, as shown in Figure A2.
Despite similarities at baseline, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the program response of
isolated and connected households. The DD in enrolment rates among eligible and connected
households is 8.3% and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while the DD for isolated households
is close to zero. In short, the previously documented positive eﬀects of PROGRESA on sec-
ondary enrolment are a combination of a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the 80% of connected
households, and a close to zero eﬀect on the 20% of isolated households. In line with this, we
note that take-up rates for school related transfers — either secondary or primary — are consis-
tently higher among connected households. Immediately after the initiating of PROGRESA,
connected households have take-up rates that are .8% higher, and this diﬀerence rises to 4.0%
by November 1999.24
The last panel in Table 4 shows the baseline levels and changes over time in primary en-
rolment rates for connected and isolated households. The baseline levels of primary enrolment
are very high to begin with, and neither types of eligible household increase their enrolment
rates relative to analogous households in control villages. This conﬁrms that transfers from
this component of PROGRESA are obtained without inducing any changes in behavior, and
therefore essentially act as a pure income eﬀect that can potentially be redistributed within the
family network.
4.2 Estimation
We deﬁne three dummy variables — (i) Dh = 1 if household h is eligible, and zero otherwise;
(ii) Pvt = 1 if PROGRESA is in place in village v in wave t, and zero otherwise, so Pvt = 0
(Pvt = 1) in the pre (post) program initiation waves in treatment villages, and Pvt = 0 in control
villages for all t; (iii) Ljh = 1 if household h has family link-j in the village, and zero otherwise.
The existence of family links is treated as being time invariant. Although in the long run we
expect family networks to endogenously adjust to the permanent presence of PROGRESA, our
analysis treats networks as ﬁxed over the time period considered.25 Our baseline speciﬁcation is
the following ﬁrst diﬀerenced OLS regression where all diﬀerences correspond to those between
November 1999 and October 1997,
∆Yhvt = α + β1∆Pvt + β2 (∆Pvt × Ljh) + β3Ljh + λ
′Xhv+∆uhvt. (4.1)
24Among non-eligibles, neither connected nor isolated households in treated villages have any signiﬁcant
changes in enrolment vis-à-vis analogous households in control villages (not shown).
25In support of this, we reiterate that the share of households reporting a migrant head or spouse is only .4%
(.5%) in wave 3 (5), and that the share of households with such migrants does not diﬀer across treatment and
control villages. In the Appendix we show our main results to be robust to redeﬁning family networks on the
basis of additional information collected in May 1999.
14∆Yhvt is the change in secondary enrolment within the same household over time, and ∆uhvt
captures unobserved time varying household characteristics, and standard errors are clustered
by village. Time invariant household determinants of enrolment — such as household preferences
or ability — are diﬀerenced out in this speciﬁcation. To capture any omitted time varying
factors that would diﬀerentially drive enrolment rates in treatment and control villages and be
correlated to family links Ljh, in (4.1) we control for a series of characteristics Xhv of the head,
spouse, household, and village. Moreover we allow there to be a direct impact of the family
link-j on secondary enrolment to allow for the eﬀect of having family present in the village to
change over time, say because of changes in other public assistance programs.26
To see how this speciﬁcation relates to our parameters of interest, consider the simplest
case in which Ljh = 1 if the household has any extended family present and Ljh = 0 if the
household is isolated in that no members of its extended family live in the same village. If
(4.1) is then estimated only for eligibles (Dh = 1), β1 + β2 identiﬁes the average treatment
eﬀect of PROGRESA on eligibles in treated villages that are embedded within family networks
(Ljh = 1). We denote this parameter as TTE1. This diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DD) in secondary
enrolment is estimated from a comparison of the average change in enrolment among eligibles
in treatment villages with extended family present, relative to eligibles in control villages who
also have family present.
Similarly, β1 identiﬁes the average response to the program among eligible but isolated
households (Ljh = 0), denoted TTE0, from the DD in enrolment of isolated households in
treatment and control villages. If families share resources, there exists a wedge between the
behavioral responses of connected and isolated households to PROGRESA, so that TTE1 >
TTE0.
If (4.1) is estimated only for non-eligibles (Dh = 0), β1 + β2 identiﬁes the average indirect
treatment eﬀect of PROGRESA on non-eligibles in treatment villages that are embedded within
extended family networks. We denote this parameter as ITE1. Finally, when (4.1) is estimated
for non-eligibles, β1 identiﬁes the average indirect treatment eﬀect of the program among non-
eligible and isolated households, ITE0. These ITEs shed light on whether there exist within
village spillovers of PROGRESA on secondary school enrolment. Spillovers onto non-eligibles
may arise either because extended family networks span eligibles and non-eligibles and resource
transfers take place between all households in the network, or because of general equilibrium
eﬀects of PROGRESA.
26The controls in Xhv are the head and spouse’s ages, literacy status, whether (s)he speaks an indigenous
language, the household poverty index, whether the household owns any land, and household size at baseline.
At the village level we control for the number of households in the village to capture any scale eﬀects, the share
of households that are eligible to capture any aggregate income eﬀects, the marginality index for the village, and
the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligibles. This may correlate to distances to
school facilities for example. Hence we do not exploit data from villages that have all eligible or all non-eligible
households so the TTEs and ITEs are identiﬁed from the same set of villages. As randomization into treatment
and control groups takes place within region, we control for regional ﬁxed eﬀects throughout.
154.3 Identiﬁcation
Equation (4.1) makes precise the assumptions required for the TTE and ITE parameters to
be identiﬁed. First we require the standard twin assumptions of no cross village spillovers and
random assignment of villages into treatment and control villages (Cov(∆Pvt,∆uh) = 0). In
support of the ﬁrst identifying assumption, we note that villages were, in part, included in the
evaluation data because they were geographically remote subject to their being schools and
health clinics available [Skouﬁas and McClaﬀerty 2001]. In terms of the second identifying as-
sumption, it is has been previously documented that village characteristics do not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer in treatment and control villages suggesting randomization worked [Behrman and Todd
1999, Schultz 2004, Behrman et al 2005]. Moreover, the descriptive evidence in Table 2 sug-
gests the eligibles and non-eligibles are similar in terms of the existence of family links across
treatment and control villages.
Together these assumptions imply the change in enrolment for eligibles and non-eligibles in
the absence of treatment in treatment villages would have been, on average, identical to the
change in enrolment in the absence of the program in control villages. In other words, eligibles
(non-eligibles) in control villages provide a valid counterfactual for eligibles (non-eligibles) in
treatment villages.
To then estimate whether the TTEs and ITEs vary with regards to extended family links
of type-j, namely to consistently estimate β2, requires an additional assumption that the pres-
ence of link type-j is uncorrelated with unobservables that drive the response to PROGRESA
(Cov(Ljh,∆uh) = 0). However a central concern is that β2 captures two eﬀects — (i) the re-
sponse to the PROGRESA program diﬀers according to whether a household is isolated or
embedded within a family network; (ii) connected and isolated households diﬀer in character-
istics that drive responses to PROGRESA and are correlated to the presence of the extended
family.
To isolate the impact of the extended family per se, we need to purge the estimates of factors
that both drive the presence of extended family and responses to PROGRESA. To do this we
proceed as follows. First, we estimate what are the correlates of extended family link of type-j
being present in the village or not, as detailed in the Appendix. These results, reported in
Table A3, highlight that the following life cycle and cohort characteristics are robust predictors
of whether extended family members reside in the same village or not — whether the head’s
(spouse’s) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the head
(spouse) is literate, whether the household owns land, and whether household size at baseline
is above or below the median among couple headed households. Using this analysis to guide
our approach we then allow for a household’s response to PROGRESA to be heterogeneous
along each of these dimensions. Hence we estimate the following speciﬁcation for eligibles and
16non-eligibles,
∆Yhvt = α +β1∆Pvt + β2 (∆Pvt × Ljh) + β3Ljh +λ
′Xhv+
￿
i
γ2iZi +
￿
i
γ3i (∆Pvt × Zi)+ ∆uhvt,
(4.2)
where Zi refers to each life cycle and cohort related dimension along which we allow the re-
sponse to PROGRESA to be heterogenous, in addition to allowing for heterogeneous responses
with the presence of the extended family link type-j. We additionally allow Zi to include the
average village level enrolment rates among eligible and non-eligibles at baseline, to pick up
any diﬀerential trends in enrolment by eligibility status.27 Overall, we therefore shed light on
whether there exists a diﬀerential eﬀect of being embedded within a family network or not,
over and above any heterogeneous eﬀects of characteristics that predict the existence of family
links.
Finally, in support of the identifying assumption that Cov(Ljh,∆uh) = 0, we provide three
pieces of additional evidence. First, we estimated a propensity score for being connected, for
each household based on the variables in Xhv, regional ﬁxed eﬀects, and a full set of household
demographic characteristics. The distribution of the propensity score by extended family links,
reveals connected and isolated households to be, overall, balanced in household observables
(Figure A1). Second, connected and isolated households have similar baseline enrolment rates,
and similar levels and distributions of permanent income, as measured by the household poverty
index (Figure A2). Third, the distribution of potential transfers available to isolated and
connected households is very similar, again because the demographic characteristics of children
do not diﬀer across these household types at baseline (Figure 2A).
Any remaining econometric concerns relate to time varying unobservables, ∆uh, that — (i)
are correlated to the existence of extended family; (ii) cause heterogeneous responses to PRO-
GRESA; and, (iii) do not drive the baseline levels of enrolment to be diﬀerent across connected
and isolated households. In the Appendix we present a series of robustness checks that allow
program responses to vary with more village level characteristics, we explore the robustness of
the results in alternative subsamples of villages, and address concerns over unobserved house-
hold level characteristics such as economic shocks driving enrolment changes.28
27As the eﬀects of PROGRESA are allowed to be heterogeneous along other dimensions Zi, the TTEs and
ITEs are evaluated at the mean value of each variable in Zi.
28A concern over the interpretation of the results stems from PROGRESA having a direct eﬀect on fertility.
If so the opportunity cost of female time will change and this may in turn drive schooling responses. Todd
and Wolpin [2006] develop and test a dynamic structural model of schooling and fertility choices, and ﬁnd that
fertility rates are insensitive to the value of PROGRESA transfers, a result conﬁrmed using a reduced form
approach [Schultz 2004].
175 Does The Presence of Extended Family Matter?
5.1 Baseline Results
To begin with, Column 1 of Table 5 benchmarks our estimates against the existing literature
by reporting standard TTE and ITE estimates of PROGRESA from speciﬁcation (4.1), by
pooling eligibles and non-eligibles and interacting ∆Pvt, Ljh, and (∆Pvt×Ljh) with the dummy
for eligibility status, Dh. These are averaged across households irrespective of their extended
family structure. The TTE estimate implies eligibles have a 7.8% increase in their secondary
enrolment rate compared to eligibles in control villages, which is similar in magnitude to the
previously documented program eﬀects [Schultz 2004]. The ITE estimate implies non-eligibles
in treatment and control villages have similar changes in their secondary enrolment. This sug-
gests that, on average, there are no signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects of PROGRESA on the secondary
enrolment of non-eligibles.
Column 2a estimates all four parameters of interest from a single regression. The result
conﬁrms that the TTE of PROGRESA is actually comprised of a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
eligibles that have extended family members present in the village (TTE1 > 0), and a negligible
and non signiﬁcant eﬀect among isolated households (TTE0 = 0).
There is no evidence of any ITEs on average for either households in family networks or
isolated households. The fact that the ITE1 is close is to zero itself implies there are no within
family spillovers in secondary enrolment rates for these households. If recipient households
redistribute some fraction of their transfers to non-eligibles within the same family network,
then either — (i) the amount transferred is too small for the average ITE1 to be positive
and signiﬁcant; or, (ii) recipient households do not themselves use such resources to increase
secondary enrolment, but rather use them to change behavior along other margins such as
consumption, say.29
At the foot of the table we report the triple diﬀerences, ∆TTE = TTE1 − TTE0, and
∆ITE = ITE1 − ITE0. The former captures the diﬀerential eﬀect of PROGRESA between
eligible connected and isolated households within treatment villages, and similarly, the latter
captures the diﬀerential eﬀect of PROGRESA between non-eligible connected and isolated
households within treatment villages. Column 2a shows that connected eligibles experience
a 8.4% increase in their secondary enrolment rate relative to eligible but isolated households
within treatment villages. Moreover, the ∆ITE estimate implies non-eligibles with and without
extended family present have almost identical changes in enrolment from the baseline period.
Given these results on the ITEs, we now focus on the TTEs and return to discuss the ITEs
29Two further points are of note. First, the estimated parameters of interest are very similar whether they
are estimated from separate regressions for connected and isolated households, or from a pooled regression.
This implies the marginal eﬀects of the other controls do not diﬀer between connected and isolated households.
Second, the coeﬃcient on Ljh, β3, which recall is not used to estimate any of our parameters of interest, is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This suggests the eﬀect of having an extended family on the level of enrolment
in the absence of Progresa, is not changing over this time period.
18in Section 7.30
Column 2b estimates (4.2) and allows responses to PROGRESA to vary along a number
of additional dimensions that are correlated with the presence of extended family (Table A3),
and also allows the response to PROGRESA to vary with the baseline village enrolment rates
among eligibles and non-eligibles. We ﬁnd the previous pattern of coeﬃcients is robust to the
inclusion of these interactions. Connected eligibles have a — (i) 9.2% increase in their enrolment
rate relative to connected eligibles in control villages; (ii) 8.6% increase in their enrolment rate
relative to isolated eligibles in treatment villages. The previous estimates do not appear to
merely pick up heterogenous responses along observable dimensions that are correlated with
the existence of extended family links.31
While we can never rule out with certainty that there exists some unobserved characteristic
that drives the results, the stability of the estimates across speciﬁcations (4.1) and (4.2) is
reassuring, and the requirements for such a variable to explain the data are stringent. In
particular the unobserved characteristic should — (i) be correlated to the presence of extended
family in the village; (ii) drive responses to PROGRESA; (iii) not drive the baseline levels of
enrolment to be diﬀerent across connected and isolated households.
Estimating (4.2) allows us to benchmark the magnitude of the eﬀect of being embedded in
a family network vis-à-vis other observable characteristics. We ﬁnd that — (i) the magnitude
of TTE1 is larger than the TTE of most other observable characteristics; (ii) there are few
observable dimensions along which household behavior is as heterogenous as with regards to
whether members of the extended family are present or not. For example, the TTE of the
household owning land is .082, the TTE of the household not owning land is .065. While both
these TTEs are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, the diﬀerence between them is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.32
We next repeat the analysis for boy’s and girl’s secondary enrolment separately. Columns
3a and 3b estimate (4.2) and show that, ﬁrst, connected eligibles signiﬁcantly increase the
30As ∆ITE corresponds to coeﬃcient on the interaction term, Ljh.Dh, the results suggest there is no diﬀer-
ential eﬀect of having extended family by eligibility status. Reassuringly, this is in line with the presence of
extended family not proxying for some unobservable that varies with eligibility status and drives enrolment over
time.
31Two simple explanations of this result would be that — (i) isolated households have higher enrolment rates
to begin with and so have less scope to respond to the program; (ii) trends in enrolment rates among isolated
households are diﬀerent to others households over this time period. Neither of these explanations is supported
by the data. Although isolated households do have slightly higher enrolment rates than households embedded
in family networks at baseline, these enrolment rates are overtaken by November 1999 by the other households.
Second, the pattern of coeﬃcients on the ITEs rule out the explanation that isolated households are naturally
changing their enrolment rates over this time period.
32The TTEs of the head being above (below) the median age among all couple headed households is .090
(.062), the spouse being above (below) the median age is .070 (.082), the head being literate (illiterate) is .061
(.118), the spouse being literate (illiterate) is .061 (.099), and the household size at baseline being above (below)
the median of all couple headed households is .041 (.096). These TTEs are all signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
diﬀerence in TTEs are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero except along two margins — the head being literate
or not (∆TTE = .057 and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level), and household size at baseline being above or below
the median (∆TTE = −.054 and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
19enrolment of boys and girls more than analogous households in control villages. Second, eligible
but isolated households do not respond to the program in terms of boys enrolment, although the
TTE0 estimate is imprecisely estimated. As a result, the ∆TTE shows that the null hypothesis
that within treated villages connected and isolated households have the same response cannot
be rejected. Third, eligible but isolated households do not respond to the program in terms of
girls enrolment, despite the monetary value of conditional cash transfers being higher for girls’
enrolment, and the baseline level of girls’s enrolment being lower.
Having established the importance of being embedded within a family network for a house-
holds response to PROGRESA, we now begin to unpack why this is the case. To begin with, a
necessary condition behind why connected and isolated households respond diﬀerentially to the
program, is that the level of transfers conditional on secondary enrolment is not suﬃcient to
compensate the average eligible household for the opportunity costs of child labor. To provide
some evidence on this we use cross sectional variation in adult wage rates in October 1998 to
identify villages with above and below the median level of adult wages.
The results show that in villages where wages are suﬃciently high — (i) in terms of boys
secondary enrolment, neither connected nor isolated households respond to PROGRESA (Col-
umn 4a); (ii) in terms of girls secondary enrolment, it remains the case that only connected
households respond to the program (Column 4b). If children are substitutes for adults in the
local labor market so that their wages are positively correlated with adult wages, and if boys
are more likely to be engaged in labor market activities relative to girls — as documented by
Skouﬁas and Parker [2001], then the results suggest the magnitude of transfers is not large
enough to induce many households to change their behavior and increase the school enrolment
of boys. Moreover, for connected households, there exist limits to the resources family networks
can redistribute towards members with secondary school aged children.33
A second important factor underlying why connected and isolated households may respond
diﬀerentially to the program is that extended families share resources. We therefore check
whether family wealth is correlated to secondary enrolment rates at baseline for connected
households. To do so, we regress the baseline enrollment rate against the set of controls de-
scribed above, and additionally control for the average poverty index — which is positively
related to family wealth — among households in the extended family. The result in Column
5 shows that wealthier households have signiﬁcantly higher enrolment rates at baseline. The
coeﬃcient implies that if there were to be a one standard deviation increase in the poverty
index of the average family member, the households secondary enrolment rate would rise by
2%, relative to a baseline enrolment of 65%.
33Using wages as measured in October 1998 may be problematic if in villages where children withdraw from the
labor market as a result of the program, are those that experience the greatest adult wage increases. However,
October 1998 corresponds to only ﬁve months after the introduction of the program. Hence wages are unlikely to
have adjusted to such an extent so as to change the cross sectional ranking of villages by adult wages. Moreover
we note that the correlation over time in adult wages in the 212 villages in which wages are available both at
baseline and in October 1998, is .749.
20In the Appendix we present a series of robustness checks on our main result that only
connected households respond to PROGRESA. The ﬁrst series of checks relate to concerns over
the surnames information and matching algorithm. In particular we show the robustness of the
baseline results to — (i) potential measurement error in surnames; (ii) limiting the sample to
smaller villages where there is less likelihood of spurious family links being deﬁned; (iii) the fact
that our matching algorithm may measure the intrinsic value of surnames rather than having
anything inherently to do with extended family links. The second series of checks address
— (i) the concern that there are unobserved village level characteristics that drive both the
presence of isolated households and their diﬀerential response to PROGRESA; (ii) the concern
that there may be unobserved time varying household characteristics that drive their program
responses such as whether they are subject to economic shocks post-program initiation; (iii) the
underlying identifying assumption that there are no spillover eﬀects from treatment to control
villages; (iv) the underlying assumption that extended family networks are not changing over
time.34
5.2 Understanding Why Families Matter
To understand why connected and isolated households respond diﬀerently, we exploit the design
feature of PROGRESA that transfers provided conditional on primary enrolment eﬀectively
act as a pure income eﬀect on households. This implies, ﬁrst, households with and without
primary school aged children should respond diﬀerentially to PROGRESA in terms of secondary
enrolment. Second, if families share resources, then the diﬀerential response between connected
and isolated households depends on the presence of primary school aged children in eligible
households within the extended family.
On the ﬁrst mechanism, we estimate how the average treatment eﬀect varies with the value
of transfers received by the household, and the presence of primary school aged children in
the household. On the second mechanism, we estimate how the average treatment eﬀect varies
with the average value of transfers received by eligibles in the extended family of connected
households, and the presence of primary school aged children in the family network. As transfers
are provided conditional on household behavior, the actual transfers received are endogenously
determined. We therefore proxy actual transfer receipts with the potential value of transfers
the household could have received, as measured in October 1998. This is determined by the
demographic characteristics of children in the household at baseline.
Figure 2A shows that the distribution of potential transfers available to isolated and con-
nected households is very similar, because the demographic characteristics of children in isolated
34An additional concern is that if children can ﬂexibly supply any amount of hours to the labor market, then
children may enrol in school 85% of their time — just suﬃcient to obtain PROGRESA transfers — and then devote
the remaining 15% of their time to continue earning in the labor market. This hypothesis is not supported by
the data. Attendance rates in November 1999 are over 95% for both boys and girls, suggesting indivisibilities
or ﬁxed costs in supplying labor to the market.
21and connected households do not diﬀer at baseline. Figure 2B plots the potential transfers each
eligible connected household with secondary school age children receives against the average
potential transfer eligible households in its family network are entitled to. The correlation
between them is only -.01, because, as documented in Table 3, there exists considerable vari-
ation in the demographic characteristics of children across households within the same family
network.
We then use the following speciﬁcation to estimate how, for eligibles, the response to PRO-
GRESA varies with the potential transfers received by household h itself (T O
h ), and with the
average value of transfers received by eligibles among the extended family (TF
h ),
∆Yhvt =
α + β
O
1
￿
∆Pvt × TO
h
￿
+ β
F
1
￿
∆Pvt × TF
h
￿
+ β
O
2 T O
h + β
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2 TF
h
+λ
′Xhv+
￿
i
γ2iZi +
￿
i
γ3i (∆Pvt × Zi) + ∆uhvt,
(5.1)
where all other controls are as previously deﬁned, and standard errors are clustered by village.
The parameter of interest is how the response to PROGRESA varies with the intensity of
treatment,
E[∆Yhvt|∆Pvt = 1,T
O
h ,T
F
h ,Xhv,Zi]−E[∆Yhvt|∆Pvt = 0,T
O
h ,T
F
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O
1 T
O
h +β
F
1 T
F
h +
￿
i
γ3iZi.
(5.2)
As potential transfers are deﬁned for eligibles in both treatment and control villages, this
is identiﬁed from a comparison of eligibles in treatment villages with a given value of potential
transfers, relative to eligibles in control villages that have an identical value of potential trans-
fers. Both sets of households also have the same family characteristics (connected or isolated).
By controlling directly for the level of potential transfers the household and average family
member are eligible for in (5.1), we capture any direct eﬀects the demographic composition of
the household and its extended family have on changes in secondary enrolment.35
Table 6 presents the results. The upper (lower) panel shows the results for households
with (without) primary school aged children in them at baseline. This allows us to assess any
interplay between the own and family transfers and whether the household is on the margin of
enrolling children into secondary school because it receives unconditional transfers for primary
school aged children. Throughout we evaluate (5.2) at the mean values of T O
h , T F
h , and each
Zi.
Column 1 estimates the program response among isolated households. We see that the
TTE is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for isolated households, irrespective of whether they
have any primary school aged children in them or not. Repeating the exercise for connected
households in Column 2 shows that, on average, there is a positive and signiﬁcant TTE for
households both with and without primary school aged children.
35For example, families with a larger share of primary school aged children may be learning more quickly
about the net beneﬁts of secondary education for their older children, other things equal.
22The remaining Columns shed light on how these TTEs vary with the demographic com-
position of the eligible family network. We ﬁrst note that baseline enrolment rates are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between connected households embedded in family networks in which the
minority of their extended family is both eligible and have primary school aged children, and
those embedded in families where the majority of members are both eligible and have primary
school aged children. This is the case both for those connected households without primary
school aged children themselves, and those with primary school aged children. Hence it is mean-
ingful to compare the behavioral response of response to PROGRESA as the characteristics of
their extended family change across the remaining columns of Table 6.36
Column 3 focuses on families in which the minority of members are both eligible and have
primary school aged children. In such networks, PROGRESA leads to a relatively small increase
in available resources per household. The upper panel shows that households with primary
school aged children in such families signiﬁcantly respond to the program. In contrast, the lower
panel shows that connected households that receive no unconditional transfers themselves are
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the ﬂow of resources into their household, or into the households
of eligible family members.
Hence there exists a subset of connected households who do not respond to PROGRESA —
namely those that receive no unconditional transfers themselves, and are part of family networks
that potentially receive only a small cash injection from PROGRESA. This is consistent with
resource sharing within family networks if some part of the change in resources are redistributed
towards those with primary school children who are on the margin of being able to enrol their
children into secondary school.
A useful thought experiment is to ask what would have been a household’s response to the
program if it were the only household in its family network to obtain transfers? To answer
this, Column 3 reports (5.2) evaluated at T F
h = 0. The estimate implies if a household is the
only member of its extended family to obtain transfers, it does not signiﬁcantly respond to the
program in terms of secondary school enrolment. As shown in the upper panel, this is true
even for those households who have primary school aged children and are closer to being able
to fully oﬀset the opportunity costs of secondary school enrolment. This pattern of behavior —
that connected households do not respond to the program if others in their network are non-
eligible — is also found throughout the next Section, where we consider how program responses
vary with the presence and eligibility status of particular extended family members.
Finally, Column 4 focuses on the case in which the majority of family members are both
eligible and have primary school aged children. In these networks, PROGRESA leads to a
relatively large increase in resources per household. In such families, connected households
with and without primary school aged children are both sensitive on the margin to the total
36In Columns 3 and 4, the minority (majority) of family members are deﬁned to be eligible if less than (more
than or equal to) 50% of the households to which household i is connected to (at distance one) are eligible. The
inter and intra generational links we deﬁne are all at distance one.
23inﬂow of resources to the family network.
Taken together, the results help rule out other mechanisms behind why families matter. For
example one alternative hypothesis would be that isolated households are not aware of the pro-
gram, while connected households may simply share information rather than resources within
their family network. However villages in the evaluation sample are small — the average number
of households in each is 45. It is hard to conceive of a signiﬁcant proportion of households
remaining unaware of such a large scale policy intervention.
A second alternative explanation would be that the presence of extended family is correlated
to membership of ejidos which grant access to communal land, an institution that can help
enforce interlinked labour-credit contracts. This is not supported by the evidence because if
families mattered through these other channels, we would not expect household responses to
PROGRESA in terms of secondary school enrolment to depend on the extent to which other
households in the family network were eligible, or the extent to which these eligible households
received transfers speciﬁc to their primary school aged children.37
6 Which Family Members Matter and Why?
We now investigate whether and why particular members of the extended family inﬂuence the
behavior of households within the network. Exploiting the full richness of the constructed
data on extended family links helps provide further credibility to the earlier results suggesting
the behavioral response of connected households to PROGRESA diﬀers from that of isolated
households because families share resources among their members. Furthermore, distinguishing
the inﬂuence of particular family members is of intrinsic importance for the following reasons.
First, evolutionary biology predicts social concerns may diﬀer both between men and women
towards their family, and between older and younger generations of the family towards each
other [Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1972]. Second, among siblings, there may be peer pressure,
learning, conformity, cooperation, or complementarities in the schooling choices across house-
holds. Third, the pre-program demand and supply of private transfers across diﬀerent pairs of
households within the family network will vary. Whatever are these precise ex ante patterns of
monetary and non-monetary transfers, each may be crowded out or crowded in by PROGRESA
transfers. Finally, if some family members are more pivotal for the behavior of others, then
this may shed light on which households in the network should optimally be targeted in other
policy interventions.38
37In fact less than 13% of households report their occupation as ‘ejidatar’ at baseline, and this does not diﬀer
between connected and isolated households. This perhaps reﬂects that ejidos have been in decline since land
titled reforms were introduced in 1992.
38Strauss and Thomas [1995] review the empirical evidence on whether mothers behave more altruistically
towards their children than fathers. Relatedly, Duﬂo [2003] presents evidence consistent with maternal and
paternal grandmothers having diﬀerent degrees of altruism towards their grandchildren. Albarran and Attanasio
[2003] present evidence on the crowding out of private transfers by Progresa transfers, and how this varies with
the variance and persistence of income. Cox and Fafchamps [2007] review the literature on the crowding out of
24We focus on connected households throughout and for any given family link type-j, we ﬁrst
estimate speciﬁcation (4.1) only for the subset of households with that link in the village, and
shed light on whether the treatment eﬀect of PROGRESA varies with speciﬁc characteristics
of the link. Two characteristics in particular are of relevance for our analysis. First, if families
share resources, the response of any household should depend on the eligibility status of their
family links. Second, given the design of PROGRESA, the demographic composition of children
in linked households determines the extent to which they receive largely unconditional transfers
for the primary school enrolment of their children. This in turn should inﬂuence responses if
these unconditional transfers are redistributed to others in the family.39
6.1 Intra-generational Family Links
Column 1a of Table 7 estimates how the treatment eﬀects of PROGRESA vary with the presence
and eligibility status of the same gender siblings of the head and spouse of household h — namely
the brother of the head of household, and the sister of his spouse.40 Column 1a shows that
eligible households in treatment villages that have an eligible brother of the head present, namely
the uncle of the children in household h, increase secondary enrolment rates signiﬁcantly more
than analogous eligible households with eligible brothers in control villages (TTE1 > 0). In
contrast, there is no program response among eligible households with non-eligible brothers
(TTE0 = 0). Column 1b shows a similar pattern of responses among households by the
eligibility status of the sister of the spouse, namely the aunt of the children in household h.
The fact that households respond only if both they and their sibling are eligible for PROGRESA
transfers is consistent with there being few resources to redistribute within the family when
other members of the extended family are not eligible for PROGRESA.
The next columns explore whether for a given eligibility status of the sibling, the demo-
graphic composition of children in the sibling’s household aﬀects the response of household h
to the program. This pins down whether there is a redistribution of unconditionally received
transfers from households with primary school aged children to their eligible siblings. We there-
fore deﬁne the link variable, Ljh, to be equal to one if the head of household h has an eligible
brother that has secondary school aged children, and equal to zero if the head of household h
has eligible brothers that only have primary school aged children.
within family transfers by publicly provided transfers.
39For example, to understand whether the program response of household h varies with the eligibility status of
the brother of the head of household, we deﬁne our link variable, Ljh, to be equal to one if the head of household
h has brothers present in the village and at least one brother is himself eligible for PROGRESA transfers, and
zero if brothers are present in the village but all are non-eligible. The average couple headed household with
secondary school aged children has 1.24 brothers of the head and .657 sisters of his spouse present in the village.
40We focus on same gender siblings because, ﬁrst, these household pairs are likely to be at similar stages of
the life cycle and so more similar on observables than cross-gender sibling pairs still resident in the village. In
particular secondary and primary school aged children are likely to be observed in both households. Second,
as shown in Table 3, the proportion of households with same gender siblings is the same across treatment and
control villages by eligibility — the same is not true for cross-gender sibling pairs.
25Column 2a shows households with eligible brothers of the head present signiﬁcantly in-
crease secondary enrolment relative to analogous households in control villages. Importantly,
the magnitude of the response is more than twice as large if siblings receive largely uncondi-
tional transfers through only having primary school aged children. Column 2b shows a similar
pattern of results when we consider how the response of households varies with the demographic
composition of children in the eligible household of the sister of the spouse.
One concern is that households whose siblings have younger children may diﬀer on unob-
servables to those whose siblings have older children, and such unobservables drive program
responses. This is addressed in Columns 3a and 3b that show, conditional on the sibling being
non-eligible, the demographic composition of the children of siblings does not inﬂuence the re-
sponse of household h. It is not therefore the case that households that have siblings with young
children respond diﬀerently to the program per se. Rather it is the interaction of those siblings
being eligible for PROGRESA, with siblings receiving unconditional transfers for the primary
school enrolment of their children, that allows household h to itself respond to PROGRESA.
This is consistent with within family resource transfers taking place from eligible households
with primary school aged children to the households of their eligible siblings with secondary
school aged children. Such receiving households are likely to be on the margin of enrolling their
children into secondary school.
Finally, the results also show the presence of siblings with secondary school aged children
only inﬂuences program responses if those siblings are themselves eligible for PROGRESA. This
evidence contradicts the hypotheses that siblings share any ﬁxed costs of secondary school, or
that behavior is driven by conformity or peer eﬀects within siblings based on secondary school
outcomes. This is because such mechanisms should operate independent of the eligibility status
of sibling links.
On the other hand, the result may reﬂect that some portion of the transfers received for
secondary school enrolment are also viewed as de facto unconditional cash transfers that can
be redistributed within the family network. This is to be expected given — (i) baseline sec-
ondary enrolment rates of around 65%; (ii) around 50% of households with secondary school
aged children at baseline sending all of their children to secondary school. Hence we note
that approximately 33% of eligible households with secondary school aged children receive de
facto unconditional cash transfers related to these children, in comparison to 90% for eligible
households with primary school aged children.
6.2 Inter-generational Family Links
We now explore how household behavior is shaped by the characteristics of those in the family
network that are inter-generationally linked. We ﬁrst consider the links between the head and
spouse of household h to their adult sons or daughters that head their own household j in the
village. These individuals correspond to the adult siblings of the children actually resident in
26household h. Given the age structure of these links, we consider how the program response of
household h in terms of secondary school enrolment rates varies with the eligibility status and
the presence of young children in household j. The presence of young children matters if the
resources available to be shared are those transfers received on a largely unconditional basis,
such as those for primary school enrolment, or the attendance of children aged under ﬁve to
local health clinics.
As with sibling links, Column 1a of Table 8 shows eligible households only respond to
PROGRESA if their adult son is also eligible (TTE1 > 0, TTE0 = 0). Column 1b conﬁrms
this applies equally to adult daughters resident in the village. To pin down whether these
responses reﬂect within family resource transfers from adult children to their parents, we note
ﬁrst that the adult son is himself unlikely to have secondary school aged children. We therefore
estimate how the treatment eﬀects vary in household h with the demographic composition of
children in the eligible households of their adult sons and daughters. Given the age proﬁle of
such households, we consider the inﬂuence of eligible adult child households that have primary
school aged children versus those that have no primary school aged children and are thus eligible
either because of the presence of very young children or a pregnant wife.
Columns 2a and 2b show the response of households, in terms of secondary school enrol-
ment, increases conditional on their adult sons and daughters being eligible, and irrespective
of the demographic composition of children in their adult son and daughter’s households. This
suggests adult sons and daughters view both components — transfers conditional on the primary
school enrolment of their children and those conditional on their attendance to health clinics —
as pure income transfers that can be redistributed within the family network.
Finally, we consider inter-generational links from the head and spouse to their parents —
namely, the paternal and maternal grandparents of the children in household h. Such elderly
households can be eligible for a health component of the program where those aged over 60 are
required to attend a clinic once per year. The results in Columns 3a and 3b show the response
of households to the program are generally weaker in the presence of the paternal or maternal
grandparents of the children. Unlike the other family links considered, this is the case irrespec-
tive of the eligibility status of the household in which the paternal or maternal grandparents
reside. This may reﬂect the low monetary value of transfers such elderly households are eligible
for [Skouﬁas 2005].41
41The evaluation data contains limited information on pre-program transfers. We note that those households
deﬁned to be of older generations are more likely to report receiving transfers at baseline. This is consistent
with evidence from the Mexican Family Life Survey that transfers tend to ﬂow from younger generations to
older generations in the family network.
277 Discussion
We have presented evidence from the PROGRESA social assistance program on whether and
how household behavior is inﬂuenced by the presence and characteristics of its extended fam-
ily. Our central ﬁnding is that PROGRESA raises secondary enrolment only among eligible
households that are embedded in extended family networks. Eligible but isolated households do
not respond. Our results suggest a key channel through which the extended family inﬂuences
household schooling choices relates to the redistribution of resources among family members
to enable eligible family members to fully overcome the opportunity costs of enrolling their
children into secondary school.
There are a number of common themes running throughout our analysis that we now bring
to the fore. The ﬁrst stems from the design feature of PROGRESA that transfers are provided
directly to women. If this increases females’ bargaining power, household behavior may be
diﬀerentially inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the extended family of the wife relative to that
of her husband. However, throughout the paper we ﬁnd no evidence that the family links of the
spouse are more inﬂuential than are the family links of her husband. The mechanism through
which extended family aﬀects household schooling behavior — resource sharing — is qualitatively
the same for both the head and spouse’s family links.42
A second common theme is that there is little evidence of any indirect treatment eﬀect of
PROGRESA, namely that secondary enrolment rates among non-eligibles in the family network
do not increase on average. This suggests either — (i) resources are not transferred from eligibles
to non-eligibles in the network; (ii) the amounts transferred are small; (iii) non-eligibles do not
themselves use these resources to increase secondary enrolment.43
To shed light on this, in a companion paper we develop and test a model of insurance
in these villages using the constructed data on extended family networks. Using information
on consumption expenditures and exploiting the PROGRESA intervention as an exogenous
income shock, we ﬁnd evidence of positive and signiﬁcant TTEs and ITEs in consumption
for households embedded in family networks, and no eﬀect for isolated households. This is in
line with connected households sharing risk within the extended family, and not with unrelated
42This result does not however imply that female bargaining power or the distribution of resources within the
household is unaltered by PROGRESA [Attanasio and Lechene 2002].
43Note that we do not ﬁnd robust evidence of an eﬀect of the program on the school enrolment of the average
non-eligible. Spillover eﬀects in schooling have been reported by Bobonis and Finan [2008] and Cattaneo and
Lalive [2006], although Behrman et al [2005] ﬁnd no such spillovers. These alternative ﬁndings may stem from
methodological diﬀerences. For example, Bobonis and Finan [2008] and Cattaneo and Lalive [2006] match
children over the waves of the data and consider changes in each individual’s enrolment status. Cattaneo and
Lalive [2006] focus on the eﬀects of the program in its ﬁrst year up to October 1998 (wave 3), and consider the
enrolment among primary school aged children and those transiting from primary to secondary school. Bobonis
and Finan [2008] consider changes in enrolment of those children that have completed primary school at baseline,
and ﬁnd such spillover eﬀects predominantly among those in non-eligible households on the margin of being
eligible. Taken together, these results suggest there may be heterogeneous spillover eﬀects on non-eligibles, and
heterogeneous eﬀects on the children within non-eligibles. Whether extended families inﬂuence the nature of
such spillovers remains a question for future research.
28villagers.44
The ﬁnal theme running throughout our analysis has been the interplay between the design
of conditional cash transfer programs, the presence of extended family members, and household
responses to the program. There are three policy implications of our ﬁndings for the design of
such programs. First, if families share resources, how connected households respond to such
policies on any given margin, will generally depend on the eligibility status of others in their
network. The particular design features of PROGRESA also lead to the behavior of connected
households to depend on the demographic composition of others in the family network. More
generally, our ﬁndings highlight that ignoring the presence and characteristics of the extended
family can lead to an incomplete understanding of the forces driving the behavioral responses
of households to large scale policy interventions in developing country settings.
Second, in this setting the value of transfers conditional on secondary school enrolment
is not suﬃciently high to oﬀset any potential loss in children’s labor market earnings if they
were to enrol into full time secondary education. Our results suggest that the resources spent
on PROGRESA could therefore be more eﬃciently targeted if the policy aim is to increase
secondary school enrolment. In particular, if the program’s entire budget were to be channelled
into transfers conditional on secondary school enrolment — with no component conditioned on
primary enrolment, and such that the value of transfers oﬀset children’s labor market earnings
— then we would expect both isolated and connected households to increase their secondary
enrolment rates.45
Finally, our analysis has general implications for understanding the role of family networks in
developing economies. Using data from over 22,000 households in 506 villages in rural Mexico,
we have documented that 20% of couple headed households are isolated in that none of their
extended family members are geographically proximate in the same village. The incidence of
this type of isolatedness is therefore at least as high as the incidence of single headedness,
which aﬀects 15% of households in our data. While there exists a large literature on the eﬀects
of single headedness on household welfare, our data and results suggest the importance of
designing future surveys to identify isolated households in other settings, and more generally,
to establish the social ties between households in survey data. Such information can then be
44These results build on those of Angelucci and De Giorgi [2009] who ﬁnd there to be indirect eﬀects on the
consumption of non-eligibles in treatment villages. They present evidence that this occurs through the insurance
and credit markets — households indirectly beneﬁt from their neighbors higher income by receiving more transfers,
by borrowing more when hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock, and by reducing their precautionary savings.
Angelucci and De Giorgi [2009] and Gertler et al [2006] provide evidence that local food prices do not change
signiﬁcantly over time between treatment and control villages suggesting that any ITEs are not being driven
by general equilibrium eﬀects of PROGRESA.
45Todd and Wolpin [2006] develop and test a structural dynamic model of the schooling and fertility eﬀects
of PROGRESA. They ﬁnd the policy as currently designed increases years of schooling on average by .5 years.
They then estimate the eﬀect of a revenue neutral reform that eliminates transfers to children in grades 3 to
5 and increasing transfers to those in grades 6 to 9 by around 50%. They ﬁnd such a reform would increase
average completed schooling by an additional .1 years. Attanasio et al [2005] conduct a similar experiment and
also ﬁnd larger eﬀects on secondary enrolment of such revenue neutral policy alternatives.
29used to understand the eﬀects of isolation and being part of geographically proximate kinship
networks on household behavior and welfare. This forms the basis of a broad and challenging
research agenda.46
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33Table 1: The Number of Extended Family Links, by Type of Link
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard error in parentheses clustered by village
Outside the Household and in the Village
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated
From head of household to: .461 - - - .652 - 2.23 - 3.34 -
(.010) (.066) (.111) (.164)
From spouse of household to: .250 - - - .652 - 1.63 - 2.54 -
(.007) (.066) (.103) (.160)
Inside the Household
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated
From head of household to: .062 .079 3.23 3.10 .821 .787 .033 .052 4.15 4.02
(.003) (.006) (.027) (.043) (.015) (.021) (.002) (.007) (.035) (.056)
From spouse of household to: .018 .021 3.23 3.10 .821 .787 .013 .017 4.09 3.93
(.001) (.003) (.027) (.043) (.015) (.021) (.001) (.003) (.034) (.054)
Notes: The sample is restricted to couple headed households in the baseline survey. Standard errors are clustered by village. Of the 22553 households that can be tracked in the first and third wavesof Progresa, 84.2% report to
be couple headed in October 1997 (wave1). We define the head of the household to be the male among the couple. By construction, the number of family links to parental households is alwaystwo conditional on such a family link
existing. By construction, the number of children of the couple inside and outside the household are identical for the head and the spouse. Adult children are defined to be at least 17 years of age.Table 2: Probability of an Extended Family Link
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard errors in parentheses clustered by village
Intra-generational Family Links Inter-generational Family Links
Any Family Link 
(Connected)
Any Family Link 
of the Head
Any Family Link 
of the Spouse
Head to Head 
(Brothers)
Head to 
Spouse
Spouse to 
Head
Spouse to Spouse 
(Sisters)
Parents to 
Son
Parents to 
Daughter
Son to 
Parent
Daughter to 
Parent
Eligible Households
     Treatment .817 .693 .550 .506 .351 .338 .306 .150 .077 .169 .108
(.011) (.012) (.014) (.013) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.009) (.006) (.008) (.007)
     Control .800 .682 .541 .503 .364 .348 .314 .149 .079 .163 .097
(.017) (.020) (.023) (.023) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.014) (.009) (.011) (.008)
     Difference .017 .012 .009 .003 -.013 -.010 -.008 .002 -.002 .006 .011
(.020) (.023) (.028) (.026) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.016) (.010) (.013) (.011)
Non-eligible Households
     Treatment .808 .712 .523 .532 .332 .258 .248 .198 .112 .142 .074
(.016) (.018) (.021) (.021) (.018) (.016) (.017) (.015) (.010) (.014) (.008)
     Control .802 .694 .562 .481 .353 .313 .272 .226 .112 .126 .089
(.019) (.022) (.024) (.026) (.028) (.022) (.022) (.021) (.016) (.014) (.010)
     Difference .006 .019 -.039 .051 -.021   -.055** -.024 -.028 -.000 .016 -.015
(.025) (.028) (.032) (.034) (.034) (.027) (.028) (.026) (.019) (.020) (.013)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by village. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Means and
differences are reported for those households that have secondary school age children (aged 11 to 16) in the baseline survey of October 1997. The standard errors on the differences are calculated from running a corresponding
OLS regression, which allows for the error terms to be clustered by village.Table 3: Family Network Descriptives
Means, standard deviation between villages in parentheses, standard deviation within villages in brackets
Treatment Villages
Size of Global 
Family Network
Network Size/Number of 
Households in Village
Diameter
Share that are 
Eligible
Share With Primary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Share With Secondary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Average Value of Potential Transfers 
Households in Network are Eligible 
for (March 1998, pesos)
Mean 7.66 .169 2.42 .518 .480 .480 746
Standard deviation between villages (.249) (.153) (1.20) (.233) (.150) (.139) (181)
Standard deviation within villages [.153] [.153] [2.14] [.259] [.262] [.263] [281]
Control Villages
Size of Global 
Family Network
Network Size/Number of 
Households in Village
Diameter
Share that are 
Eligible
Share With Primary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Share With Secondary School 
Aged Children at Baseline
Average Value of Potential Transfers 
Households in Network are Eligible 
for (March 1998, pesos)
Mean 7.92 .163 2.51 .525 .484 .491 756
Standard deviation between villages (.230) (.141) (1.14) (.249) (.145) (.139) (188)
Standard deviation within villages [.155] [.155] [2.07] [.229] [.252] [.258] [297]
Notes: The sample is restricted to households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. There is one observation per family network so that each network has the same weight irrespective of the number of households within it. There are 1379 family
networks in treatment villages covering 10559 households. There are 817 family networks in control villages covering 6471 households. The size of the network is the number of households in the network. The diameter of the networks is the longest distance between two
households that exists in a network. We define two households that are directly connected to be of distance one to each other. Primary school aged children are defined to be those aged 6 to 10 and resident in the household. Secondary school aged children are defined
to be those aged 11 to 16 and resident in the household. The average value of potential transfers households in the network are eligible for, are calculated among eligible households only. The standard deviations between and within villages take account of the fact that
there are an unequal number of family networks in each village.Difference
Difference Difference
Difference Difference
Table 4: Descriptive Evidence on Enrolment Rates
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard errors in parentheses clustered by village
Secondary School Enrolment Rates  (children aged 11 to 16) Primary School Enrolment Rates (children aged 6 to 10)
Eligibles, by Village Type Eligibles, by Family Link Type Eligibles, by Family Link Type
Control Treatment All Households Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated Connected Isolated
October 1997 October 1997
Difference in 
October 1997 October 1997
Difference 
in 
Difference 
in  October 1997 October 1997
Difference in  Difference in 
All children .651 .654    .069*** .653 .654    .083*** .001 .927 .890 .013 -.011
(.016) (.012) (.016) (.011) (.015) (.017) (.031) (.005) (.013) (.012) (.021)
Boys .681 .685   .043** .681 .698  .044* .040 .932 .887 .020 -.001
(.017) (.013) (.022) (.012) (.016) (.023) (.047) (.006) (.014) (.015) (.031)
Girls .603 .612    .102*** .608 .610    .131*** -.030 .925 .901 .005 -.015
(.018) (.014) (.022) (.012) (.019) (.024) (.044) (.007) (.012) (.015) (.026)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. A household's secondaryschool enrolment rate is defined to be
the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in secondary school at the time of the survey. A household's primary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 6 to 10 resident in
the household that are full-time enrolled in primary school at the time of the survey. In the left hand panel, the difference in difference is defined to be the difference in enrolment rates between households in treatment and control villages in
November 1999, minus the corresponding difference at baseline in October 1997. In the centre and right hand panels, this difference in difference is reported for connectedand isolated households separately.Standard errors on the differences
are derived from an OLS regression, estimated on eligible and non-eligibles separately, of school enrolment rates on a dummy equal to one for  Progresa villages and zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by village.Table 5: Baseline Estimates
Dependent Variable (Columns 1-4b): Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
Dependent Variable (Column 5): Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate at Baseline (October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
All Children Boys Girls Boys Girls All Children
Standard Family Links Interactions Interactions Interactions High Adult Wage Villages
Secondary Enrolment 
Rate at Baseline 
(October 1997)
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5)
TTE    .078***
(.016)
ITE -.015
(.026)
TTE [connected]    .093***    .092***   .055**    .126*** .040    .095***
(.017) (.018) (.025) (.026) (.028) (.029)
TTE [isolated] .009 .006 .041 -.035 .038 -.013
(.032) (.032) (.048) (.046) (.056) (.050)
ITE [connected] -.016 -.027 .008 -.035 .005 -.020
(.028) (.030) (.042) (.046) (.049) (.050)
ITE [isolated] -.007 -.012 .020 -.006 .056 .019
(.061) (.061) (.083) (.077) (.089) (.080)
Average poverty index of households in 
the extended family / 100
   .018***
(.006)
ΔTTE   .084**   .086** .013    .161*** .002  .107*
(.035) (.036) (.052) (.052) (.061) (.057)
ΔITE -.009 -.015 -.012 -.029 -.052 -.039
(.065) (.065) (.093) (.085) (.102) (.091)
Observations 6227 6227 6227 3947 3760 2844 2765 5919
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are
clustered by village. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the
survey. In Columns 2a onwards the link variable is defined to be equal to one if household h has any family links in the village, and zero otherwise. All specifications also control for the following - the
husband's age, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous language, the household poverty index, whether the household owns
any land, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village,
regional fixed effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households. In Columns 2b to 4b the effects of the following controls are also allowed to varywith
eligibility status, Progresa, and the interaction of the two - whether the head's (spouse's) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the head (spouse) is literate,
whether the household owns land, whether the household size at baseline is above or below the median among couple headed households, and the village level enrolment rates at the baseline among
eligible and non-eligible households. The samples in Columns 4a and 4b are restricted to villages that have above the median level of adult wages as recorded in October 1998. In Column 5 the sample
is restricted to connected households that have at least one secondary school aged child at baseline (October 1997), the dependent variable is the household's secondary enrolment rate at baseline,
and the same set of controls as in Column 1 are included. The household poverty index  increases as the household has higher permanent income.Table 6: Extended Families, Transfers, and the Response to Progresa
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Isolated Connected
Connected Households, Varying Characteristics                       
of the Local Family Network
Own Transfer
Own and Family 
Transfer
Minority of Family is Eligible and 
Has Primary School Aged Children
Majority of Family is Eligible and 
Has Primary School Aged Children
Households With Primary School Aged Children (1) (2) (3) (4)
TTE [evaluated at mean of own transfer] -.010
(.043)
TTE [evaluated at mean of own + family transfer]    .093***    .133***   .076**
(.021) (.035) (.030)
     Evaluated at mean of own transfer, family transfer = 0 .045
(.030)
Observations 659 3180 1622 1558
Households With No Primary School Aged Children
TTE [evaluated at mean of own transfer] .077
(.086)
TTE [evaluated at mean of own + family transfer]    .119*** .053  .116*
(.044) (.079) (.067)
     Evaluated at mean of own transfer, family transfer = 0 .096
(.077)
Observations 194 814 457 357
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to eligible couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are clustered by
village. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the survey. For the own transfer
effects, the value of potential transfers to the households is evaluated at the mean of the distribution of such transfers in October 1998 among all eligible couple headed households that have secondary school aged
children. In Column 2 onwards, the family refers to the local family network at degree one to the household. The value of potential transfers to the local family network that is eligible is evaluated at the mean of the
distribution of such transfers in October 1998 among the local family network (excluding the household itself) of all connected eligible couple headed households that have secondary school aged children. All
specifications also control for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous
language, the household poverty index, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the
village, regional fixed effects,and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households.In all columns the effects of the following controls are also allowed to vary with Progresa - whether
the head's (spouse's) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the head (spouse) is literate, whether the household owns land, whether the household size at baseline is above or
below the median among couple headed households, and the village level enrolment rates at the baseline among eligible and non-eligible households. In Columns 3 and 4, the minority (majority) of family members are
defined to be eligible if less than (more than or equal to) 50% of the households to which household i is connected to (at distance one) are eligible. The inter and intra generational links we define are all at distance one.Table 7: Schooling and Eligibility Status of Intra-generational Family Links
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Inter-generational Family Link Type: Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
Relationship to secondary school age children in household h:
Father to 
Uncle
Mother to 
Aunt
Father to 
Uncle
Mother to 
Aunt
Father to 
Uncle
Mother to 
Aunt
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
TTE [linked household is eligible]    .134***    .106***
(.038) (.040)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible] -.010 .061
(.046) (.058)
TTE [linked household is eligible and has secondary school age children]  .096*    .139***
(.052) (.053)
TTE [linked household is eligible and has only primary school age children]    .215***   .183**
(.075) (.085)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible and has secondary school age children] .008 .040
(.056) (.078)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible and has only primary school age children] .106 -.025
(.176) (.152)
Observations 1366 1064 631 524 369 302
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are
clustered by village. A household'ssecondaryschool enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the householdthat are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the
survey. All specifications also control for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaksan indigenouslanguage, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether
she speaksan indigenouslanguage,the householdpovertyindex, the number of individuals in the householdat baseline,the number of householdsin the village, the share of householdsin the villagethat
are eligible, the marginality index for the village, regional fixed effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households.Table 8: Eligibility Status of Inter-generational Family Links
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Inter-generational Link Type: Parents to Son
Parents to 
Daughter
Parents to Son
Parents to 
Daughter
Son to Parents
Daughter to 
Parents
Relationship to secondary school age 
children in household h:
Father to Adult 
Brother
Mother to Adult 
Sister
Father to Adult 
Brother
Mother to Adult 
Sister
Father to         
Paternal 
Grandparents
  Mother to         
Maternal 
Grandparents
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
TTE [linked household is eligible]    .206***    .173*** .085  .102*
(.045) (.054) (.053) (.060)
TTE [linked household is non-eligible] .078 .088 .001  .077*
(.077) (.120) (.037) (.046)
TTE [linked household is eligible and has 
primary school aged children]
  .148**   .171**
(.063) (.078)
TTE [linked household is eligible and has no 
primary school aged children]
   .269***   .196**
(.060) (.083)
Observations 965 499 690 384 1028 649
Notes: *** denotessignificanceat 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headedhouseholdsthat can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standarderrorsare clustered by village.
A household'ssecondaryschool enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the householdthat are full-time enrolledin school at the time of the survey. All specificationsalsocontrol
for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language,the spouse'sage, years of schooling, literacy, whether she speaksan indigenouslanguage, the household
poverty index, the number of individuals in the householdat baseline, the number of householdsin the village, the share of householdsin the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village, regional fixed
effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non-eligible households.Figure 1: Family Tree
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Notes: We use the conventionthat the head's surnamesare writtenin standard(black) font, and those of his wife are written in (red) italics.Paternal surnamesare
indicatedin upper case (F1, F2) and maternalsurnamesare indicatedin lowercase (f1, f2). First names are not shown as they are not relevantfor the construction
of extended family ties. Each household in the family tree is assumed to be couple headed purely to ease the exposition.Figure 2A: Potential Transfers in Eligible Isolated and Connected Households
Figure 2B: Potential Transfers in Eligible Households and Their Family Network
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0.1 Descriptive Evidence on Surnames
Table A1 provides descriptive evidence on each surname type — the paternal and maternal surnames
of the head (F1, f1) and spouse (F2, f2). For both head and spouse, there are fewer paternal than
maternal surnames reported. As Figure 1 shows, this reﬂects the fact that under a patronymic
naming convention, paternal surnames have a greater survival rate across generations. There
are 1696 diﬀerent paternal surnames reported by heads (F1), lower than for the other types of
surname including those reported as the spouse’s paternal surname (F2). This is both because the
patronymic naming convention implies spouse’s paternal surnames have lower survival rates across
generations than those of male heads of household, and also be partly due to spouses moving into
the 506 villages in the data from villages outside the evaluation sample.
The second row shows that the majority of surnames are mentioned at least twice. For each
surname type, the most frequent surname covers around 9% of households, and the half the
households have one of the 50 most frequent surnames for each surname type. The third row
shows the probability of two randomly matched households having the same surname type is close
to zero, and the expected number of households with the same head’s paternal surname is 13.3.
This is higher than the expected number of households with the same spouse’s paternal surname,
again suggestive of women moving into PROGRESA villages from other locations.1
The next two rows report the same information but at the village level. The probability
(without replacement) of two randomly chosen households in the village having the same surname
is orders of magnitude larger than in the population. Hence households are not randomly allocated
1These population values are calculated as follows for any given surname type. Let ni denote the number of
households with surname i and let N denote the number of households that report some surname of the given
type. The probability, without replacement, that two randomly chosen households have surname i is then Pi =
￿ni
N
￿
.
￿
ni−1
N−1
￿
, and the expected number of households in the population with name i is Ei = ni.
￿N−1
N
￿
. The values
reported in Table A1 are the averages of Pi and Ei over all surnames i.
1by surname type into villages. On the other hand, the fact that the expected number of households
in the village with the same surname is smaller than in the population implies households do not
perfectly sort into villages by surname either.2
The ﬁnal row sheds light on the degree of sorting of households into villages by surname type.
This is measured by an odds ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of the probability that two randomly
chosen households from the same village have the same surname, divided by the probability that
two randomly chosen households from PROGRESA villages have the same surname. This odds
ratio suggests households are, for example, 356 times more likely to match within a village on their
head’s paternal surname than if they were randomly allocated by this surname across villages.3
0.2 Measurement Error in Extended Family Links
There are a number of potential forms of measurement error in the surnames data that can be
checked for. The ﬁrst arises from the convention that women change their paternal surname to
their husband’s paternal surname at the time of marriage. To address this concern, we note
that the precise wording of the question speciﬁcally asks respondents to name the paternal and
maternal surname of each household member. Furthermore, in only 5.8% of households is the
spouse’s maternal surname recorded to be the same as her husband’s paternal surname. This
provides an upper bound on the extent to which measurement error of this form is occurring.
Second, if the male head is the respondent, he may not recall his wife’s maternal surname and
simply replace it with her paternal surname. This may occur because his children only inherit his
wife’s paternal surname. Reassuringly, this problem occurs in only 4.9% of households. A ﬁnal
circumspect case is households in which the paternal and maternal surnames of both the head and
spouse are all reported to be the same. This occurs for 1.6% of households, although the ﬁgure
drops to .5% if we exclude households with the most common surname in the data.4
Some forms of measurement error however cannot be addressed. The ﬁrst arises from any
remaining typos in surnames. Second, there may be two identical families in the village who share
the same paternal and maternal surnames of head and spouse but are genuinely unrelated. The
matching algorithm then assigns the number of family links to be double what they actually are. A
check for the severity of this problem is based on the following intuition. By deﬁnition, household
2These village values are calculated as follows for any given surname type. Let niv denote the number of
households with surname i in village v and nv denote the number of households that report some surname of the
type in village v. The probability, without replacement, that two randomly chosen households in the village have
surname i is then piv =
￿
niv
nv
￿
.
￿
niv−1
nv−1
￿
, and the expected number of households in the village with name i is
eiv = niv.(nv−1
nv ). The values reported in Table A1 are the weighted averages of piv and eiv over all villages v,
where the weights are niv
nv . These weights account for the same name being reported to diﬀerent extents across
villages. The expected number of matches in the village is based on only one surname, and so provides an upper
bound on the total number of extended family links our matching algorithm actually deﬁnes.
3This odds ratio is calculated as follows for any given surname type. We ﬁrst take the weighted average of
piv over all names i where the weights are nv
N . These weights take account of the fact that if two households are
drawn from the population at random, they are more likely to come from a larger village. Denote this weighted
probability as ￿ pi. The reported odds ratio is then given by
￿ pi
Pi.
4There are no diﬀerences in the incidence of these potential errors between treatment and control villages.
2i cannot have parental links to more than two other households (the parent’s of the head and
the parent’s of the spouse), conditional on the parents not being present within the household.
This is true for 97% of households using our matching algorithm. Third, consider a scenario in
which a women’s brother marries someone with the same maternal surname as himself. Then the
woman’s niece will be identiﬁed as her sister and although the households are within the same
family network, the strength of their tie may be inferred to be stronger than it actually is.
0.3 External Validity of the Extended Family Links: MxFLS Data
To provide external validity to the constructed data on extended family links in the PROGRESA
data, we present similar information from an alternative data set that was collected in a comparable
economic environment and time period. The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), collected in
2001, provides information on the number of each type of link, by head and spouse, that are
still alive in any location, not just the same village. This data set therefore provides an upper
bound on what should be recorded as family links in the PROGRESA data, in which we only
construct links in the same village. In addition, we exploit information from the household roster
in the MxFLS to also construct the number of family links inside the household, by each type of
family link, and for the head of household and his spouse separately. To make the MxFLS data
comparable, we restrict the sample to couple headed households that reside in locations with less
than 2500 inhabitants in states that are also covered in the PROGRESA data. There are 580 such
households.5
Table A2 reports the ﬁndings from the MxFLS. The number of family links to parents, children
and siblings outside the household and located anywhere, are greater than those we construct using
surnames data within the village from the PROGRESA data. The fact that more parents of the
spouse are alive is likely to be driven by spouses being younger than their husbands. Moreover, the
diﬀerences between husbands and spouses in the number of parents and siblings are less dramatic
in the MxFLS data, presumably because these statistics refer to family links in any location and
so are unaﬀected by the geographic mobility of women at the time of marriage.
The comparison of family links within the household is also informative. Here the number of
each type of family is similar to that found in PROGRESA, although the number of children is
slightly lower. This may be driven by diﬀerences in the age of respondents in the two data sets —
the age of spouses is 40.5 (43.5) in the PROGRESA (MxFLS) data. Heads and spouses are also
more educated in the MxFLS data — the mean years of schooling for heads (spouses) in MxFLS
is 3.91 (3.46) in comparison to 2.77 (2.27) in PROGRESA. These diﬀerences would explain the
lower numbers of children in the household in the MxFLS data if more educated couples have
lower fertility rates.6 Moreover, it remains the case that in the MxFLS data as in PROGRESA,
5As discussed in Section 3, one restriction on the matching algorithm used in the PROGRESA data is that we
are unable to identify links to parental households if only one of the parents is alive. To ensure the MxFLS data
is therefore comparable, we do not include information from couple headed households that report only having a
single parent alive in another household. There are no such concerns for parental links deﬁned inside the household.
6This underestimates the true diﬀerence in average years of education of couples between the two data sets
3the number of family links of the head inside the household are greater than those of the spouse.
0.4 Correlates of Extended Family Links
Before exploiting information of extended family networks to explain household behavior, a useful
stepping stone is to ﬁrst establish the correlates of the extended family being present in the
same village. This focuses attention on the econometric concerns stemming from the endogenous
formation of family networks. Moreover, this analysis also provides further supportive evidence
on the accuracy of the constructed extended family links.
A number of mechanisms drive the presence of extended family members, such as the need
for insurance and the choice of marriage partners for children [Rosenzweig and Stark 1989], the
value of services provided by social networks [Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005], inheritance of land
and other household assets [Foster 1993], and the nature of household production [Foster and
Rosenzweig 2002]. Our aim here is not to replicate such analyses, but to identify correlations
between the presence of extended family ties and three classes of observable characteristics.
First, the age of the head and spouse should be negatively correlated with the likelihood
their parents are in close proximity, and positively correlated with the probability of having adult
children in the village. These correlations are somewhat mechanical as they depend primarily on
the life cycle rather than on economic mechanisms. Second, there can be a positive correlation
between wealth or land ownership and the presence of an extended family because — (i) wealthier
family dynasties may have higher fertility and lower mortality rates; (ii) landed households both
have more need for and can support larger family sizes; (iii) wealthier families may also be more
likely to own land — as rural land markets are typically missing, the ability to inherit land, or to
acquire land speciﬁc human capital, may lead adult children to be more likely to remain within
the village than otherwise. A third mechanism driving extended family structures is the need to
insure against risk. This leads to the formation of networks of related families with negatively
correlated shocks, the strategic marriage of daughters into families with less correlated shocks,
and migration of some family members to other locations.
To shed light on these channels we estimate a conditional logit regression where the dependent
variable, Ljh, is a dummy equal to one if extended family link type-j exists for household h in the
village, and zero otherwise. We consider the correlates of each of the speciﬁc family links that we
identify, as well as on whether household h has any family connections in the village. For each
link type, Ljh, we control for the ages of the head and spouse, and dummy variables for whether
they are literate and speak an indigenous language. At the household level, we control for whether
the household owns its home, whether any land is owned, whether any member of the household
temporarily migrated in the last year, the eligibility status of the household, the household poverty
index, and household size at baseline.7
because in the MxFLS, years of schooling are top coded at 12.
7We experimented with other speciﬁcations before settling on this set of controls. For example, we do not control
for years of education because it is highly correlated with literacy — 89% (90%) of heads (spouses) have no formal
4We group the conditional logit regression by village to take account of diﬀerences across villages
that drive the formation of extended family networks. For example, villages may vary in the
riskiness of their economic environments, altering the need for households to insure each other and
therefore potentially causing alternative patterns of extended family networks to form. Standard
errors are clustered by village, we report log odds ratios so that tests of signiﬁcance relate to
the log odds being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. All continuous variables are divided by their
standard deviation so the corresponding coeﬃcients can be interpreted as the eﬀect of a one
standard deviation change in the continuous variable.
The results, reported in Table A3, highlight the following. First, the mechanical correlations
with age are as expected with older heads and spouses being signiﬁcantly less likely to have their
parents outside the household and resident in the village, and signiﬁcantly more likely to have
their adult children in other households in the village. Older heads and spouses are more likely to
have brothers present and less likely to have sisters present, presumably because, as highlighted
in Section 3, women move village at the time of marriage. Second, literate heads and spouses
are more likely to have their parents present. If such correlations persist across generations, then
parents that educate their children increase the likelihood their children remain geographically
proximate, other things equal.
Third, home and land ownership are positively correlated with the likelihood that children and
siblings reside in the same village, other things equal. The coeﬃcients are of similar magnitude
for brothers and sisters as well as for the adult children of the head and spouse (not shown). This
pattern of coeﬃcients is consistent both with inheritance norms in rural Mexico that do not favor
men over women, and with a dynastic wealth eﬀect such that wealthier families accumulate greater
assets and have higher rates of fertility. In contrast, households in which at least one member has
temporarily migrated in the last year — 18.5% of all households — are not more or less likely to
have extended family links present.
Fourth, although there is a slight positive correlation between the household poverty index
and the presence of adult children, there is no discontinuous eﬀect of eligibility on the presence
of any extended family ties. This aids the interpretation of the econometric evidence we provide.
Whether the head and spouse speak an indigenous language also does not predict the presence
of extended family ties. This is again reassuring because the unconditional number of extended
family ties, for each type of tie, are no diﬀerent between indigenous and non indigenous households.
Fifth, households that have a greater number of individuals within them are also signiﬁcantly
more likely to have a greater number of extended family members residing within the same village.
This may be due to persistent diﬀerences in fertility levels within the same family dynasty across
generations. Alternatively, the presence of extended family members may reduce the costs of
having and raising children because extended family members are able to supply of time, labor,
and other resources to the household.
schooling if they are illiterate. We focus on temporary rather than permanent migration because the proportion of
households that report any members permanently migrating in the ﬁve years prior to 1997 is only 3.3%.
5A comparison across the columns is also informative. For example, the controls have a dif-
ferential eﬀect on the likelihood that the parents of the head or spouse are present. This is in
line with the earlier evidence suggesting the process that drives the presence of parents are very
diﬀerent for the head and his spouse. In contrast, most of the controls have similar eﬀects on the
likelihood of brothers or sisters of the head and spouse being present.
In summary, the ﬁnal column shows that connected and isolated households diﬀer on a range
of observable characteristics that drive the presence of extended family. In the empirical analysis
it will therefore be important to both condition on these observables, and to allow household
responses to PROGRESA to also vary with them. Hence the analysis sheds light on whether
there exists a diﬀerential eﬀect of being embedded within a family network or not, over and above
potentially heterogeneous eﬀects of characteristics that predict the existence of family links.
0.5 Robustness Checks on the Baseline Estimates
We present a series of robustness checks on the main ﬁnding in Table 5 that only households
embedded within extended family networks respond to PROGRESA. The ﬁrst series of checks,
presented in Table A4, relate to concerns over the information on surnames and the matching
algorithm.
We ﬁrst address concerns over measurement error in the recorded surnames data that can lead
to erroneous inference on the presence of extended family members. Column 1 shows our baseline
result to be robust to dropping households with any of three potential types of measurement error
in their surnames — (i) the spouse’s maternal surname is the same as their husband’s paternal
surname; (ii) the spouse’s paternal and maternal surnames are the same; (iii) the paternal and
maternal surnames of both the head and spouse are all very similar.8
The second check addresses the concern that in larger villages, the matching algorithm is more
likely to spuriously link two households that happen to have the same paternal and maternal
surnames of head and spouse but are genuinely unrelated. Column 2 shows the baseline results to
be robust to dropping villages in the top quartile of the village size distribution, as measured by
the number of households in the village. Moreover the point estimate on the TTE1 is larger than
the baseline estimate. This may reﬂect a downward bias in TTE1 because isolated households we
previously being ascribed to be connected.
A third concern with the matching algorithm is that it actually measures the intrinsic value of
surnames rather than having anything inherently to do with extended family links. For example,
individuals with the most frequent surnames are both most likely to be found to have extended
family members present, and may belong to family dynasties that have diﬀerent unobservables that
cause them to respond diﬀerently to PROGRESA than households with less common surnames.
We address this issue in two ways.
8The results are also robust to dropping households with the most common paternal surname of either the head
or spouse in the village.
6First, we randomly reassign households in our baseline sample to another village within the
same municipality and then rerun our matching algorithm based on the surname matches in these
neighboring villages. We then explore whether our main results capture the eﬀects of true extended
family links that are present in the same village, or merely capture the eﬀects of having more or less
frequent surname combinations per se. The result in Column 3 shows there are no heterogeneous
responses to PROGRESA on the basis of these surname based links in neighboring villages — the
diﬀerence in the TTEs is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.9
Second, we estimate whether the frequency of paternal surnames predicts fertility levels at
baseline. If for example some surnames are more frequent because those dynasties have lower
mortality rates or are better able to insure against income shocks, then we expect them to have
higher fertility, other things equal. We estimate an OLS speciﬁcation analogous to our baseline
speciﬁcation where the left hand side variable is the number of children aged 0 to 16 in the
household at baseline, and we control for the share of households with the same paternal surname
of the head and spouse, as well as the previously described controls. The result in Column 4a
shows the relative frequency of paternal surnames is uncorrelated to baseline fertility levels. This
result is robust to focusing attention to only the most common paternal surnames, namely those
shared by at least .5% of the population (Column 4b).
The second series of checks, presented in Table A5, relate to a number of remaining concerns.
First, there may be unobserved village level characteristics that drive both the presence of iso-
lated households and their diﬀerential response to PROGRESA. To address this we estimate the
speciﬁcation with interactions and additionally control for village characteristics in Zi. These
characteristics are the number of village households, the share of eligible households, the village
marginality index, and the share of households that report being aﬀected by any natural shocks
from October 1998 to November 1999. Column 2 shows the baseline estimates to be robust to
allowing household responses to PROGRESA to also vary by these village characteristics.
The second check relates to time varying household characteristics that drive enrolment. Of
particular is the fact that households are subject to economic shocks that cause them to take
their children out of school [Jacoby and Skouﬁas 1997]. To address this we additionally control for
whether the household reports being aﬀected been any type of natural shock from October 1998
to November 1999, and allow responses to vary depending on this report. The result in Column
2, shows the results to be robust to the inclusion of such time varying household shocks.
The third check relates to the underlying identifying assumption that there are no spillover
eﬀects from treatment to control villages. We restrict our sample to households in villages that are
9Three points are of note. First, we only reassign the subset of 6227 households in the baseline sample. If we
were to reassign all 22,553 households then the newly constructed family ties would be more likely to capture the
actual family ties originally used. Second, we reassign households to other villages within the same municipality
because as discussed in relation to Table A1, households sort across geographic locations by surnames. Doing so,
59% of households are found to be connected. Randomly reassigning households to any other village in the data
would however dramatically reduce the likelihood any household is constructed to have family links. Finally, there
are 115 municipalities in the data, the median municipality contains six villages, and we drop municipalities that
only contain one village.
7below the median distance (5km) from any health facility, as recorded in May 1999. The result
in Column 3 shows that within such villages, where concerns over spillover eﬀects are perhaps
greatest, the signs, signiﬁcance, and magnitude of the baseline estimates continue to hold. An
alternative subset of villages in which concerns over spillover eﬀects may be particularly acute
are those villages in which there are no secondary or middle schools present. Given that children
resident in such locations attend secondary schools outside their own village, these children may be
particularly likely to be in schools with children from both treatment and control villages present.
Reassuringly, the result in Column 4 shows the previous parameter estimates to be robust to
restricting the analysis to this subset of villages.
The ﬁnal check directly addresses the assumption that extended family networks are not en-
dogenously changing over time in response to the program. To address this we use data from the
marital history module collected in May 1999 that explicitly asked spouses about whether their
parents were present in the village or not. We use this information to reconstruct extended family
ties to parents and hence to reconstruct whether households are connected or isolated. The result
in Column 5 shows the previous estimates to be robust this redeﬁnition of extended family links.
We have explored whether internal household composition changes in response to the program.
In particular we test whether the number of primary and secondary school aged children diﬀeres
signiﬁcantly at wave 5 (November 1999) between households in PROGRESA and non PROGRESA
villages. We do this for all households, by eligibility status, and by eligibility and connectedness
status. For all these comparisons (using mean comparison t-tests that allow for clustering by
village) we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in household compositions. The only exception among the
14 tests we conducted is that eligible connected households in PROGRESA villages have slightly
fewer secondary school aged children in them than connected households in non-PROGRESA
villages in November 1999, and eﬀect that is signiﬁcant at the 9% level. We have noted this
concern at the end of the Section on robustness checks on the baseline speciﬁcation. Over a longer
time period until 2003, Rubalcava and Tereil [2006] do ﬁnd changes in household composition.
In particualr they ﬁnd — (i) school children are more likely to join participating households; (ii)
participants are more likely to receive other members of the extended family who were living
elsewhere in 1997.
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9Table A1: Descriptive Statistics on Surnames, by Surname Type
Mean, standard errors in parentheses, percentages in brackets
Head's Paternal Surname Head's Maternal Surname Spouse's Paternal Surname Spouse's Maternal Surname
(F1) (f1) (F2) (f2)
Number of surnames 1696 1996 1912 2025
Number [percentage] of surnames mentioned more than once 1064 [62.7] 1188 [59.5] 1088 [56.9] 1100 [54.3]
Probability of same surname in population 9.50 x 10
-6 7.54 x 10
-6 8.60 x 10
-6 8.33 x 10
-6
(5.48 x 10
-6) (4.16 x 10
-6) (4.95 x 10
-6) (4.95 x 10
-6)
Expected number of same surname matches in population 13.3 11.2 9.92 9.26
(1.66) (1.36) (1.25) (1.19)
Probability of same surname in the village .042 .021 .022 .020
(.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Expected number of same surname matches in the village 7.55 5.31 5.42 4.98
(.039) (.036) (.036) (.040)
Odds ratio 355.7 344.8 345.4 353.0
(8.26) (7.47) (7.55) (8.18)
Notes: For the matching probabilities and expected number of same surname matches in the population, the standard errors are clustered by surname for each surname type. The sample is restricted to those households that can
be tracked for the first and third waves of the Progresa data, namely in the baseline survey in October 1997 (wave 1) and the first post program survey in October 1998 (wave 3). There are 22553 such households.Table A2: The Number of Family Links, by Type of, as Reported in the Mexican Family Life Survey
Couple Headed Households
Mean, standard error in parentheses clustered by village
Outside of the Household (ANY location)
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
From head of household to: .476 - 1.23 3.27 4.97
(.035) (.089) (.116) (.014)
From spouse of household to: .669 - 1.23 3.50 5.39
(.039) (.089) (.113) (.148)
Inside of the Household
Parent Children Aged 0-16 Adult Children Siblings All
From head of household to: .047 2.02 .571 .019 2.66
(.009) (.079) (.039) (.007) (.084)
From spouse of household to: .002 2.02 .571 .009 2.60
(.002) (.079) (.039) (.005) (.082)
Notes: The sample is taken from the first wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey, 2001. Standard errors are clustered by village. We restrict this sample to the seven Mexican states that are also covered in
the Progresa evaluation data, and to couple headed households, in locations with less than 2500 inhabitants. There are 580 such households. By construction, the number of family links to parental
households is always conditional on two such family links existing. We do not therefore use information on households that have single parents in any location. By construction, the number of children of the
couple inside and outside of the household are identical for the head and the spouse. The number of children outside of the household is restricted to be 17 and older (based on spouses' reports).Table A3: Correlates of Extended Family Links
Couple Headed Households
Conditional logit estimates, grouped on village, standard errors clustered by village, log odds ratios reported
Inter-generational Family Links Intra-generational Family Links
Type of Family Link: Parents of Head Parents of Spouse Adult Child Brothers of Head Sisters of Head Brothers of Spouse Sisters of Spouse
Any Link 
[Connected]
Head age [years]    .373***    .307***    1.48*** .953    .805***    .792***    .841***    .768***
(.023) (.024) (.079) (.041) (.037) (.034) (.041) (.041)
Spouse age [years]    .755*** 1.02    2.97***    .872*** .941    1.20*** .969    1.18***
(.043) (.072) (.166) (.037) (.041) (.052) (.047) (.063)
Head literate [yes=1]    1.45*** 1.13  .911* 1.07    1.13*** .966 .993 1.05
(.099) (.095) (.049) (.046) (.056) (.041) (.046) (.052)
Spouse literate [yes=1]   1.14**    1.30***    .785***   1.11** 1.03 1.08 .956   1.13**
(.074) (.100) (.039) (.047) (.046) (.048) (.049) (.062)
Head speaks indigenous 
language [yes=1]
1.01 .843 1.16 .963 1.02 .967 1.02 .911
(.186) (.138) (.167) (.107) (.125) (.102) (.105) (.115)
Spouse speaks indigenous 
language [yes=1]
.854 1.05 1.02 .936 .998 1.33 1.17 .998
(.144) (.148) (.145) (.094) (.133) (.175) (.151) (.154)
House is owned [yes=1] 1.03 1.08   1.34**    1.54***    1.38***    1.26***    1.33***    1.43***
(.094) (.122) (.200) (.112) (.112) (.107) (.133) (.126)
Any land is owned [yes=1]    .846*** 1.00    1.26***    1.14***    1.19***    1.11***    1.14***   1.14**
(.046) (.069) (.077) (.050) (.059) (.047) (.056) (.062)
Any member temporarily 
migrated in last year [yes=1]
1.09 .993   1.15** .937 .967 1.05 .993 1.01
(.066) (.071) (.071) (.044) (.044) (.051) (.050) (.064)
Eligible [yes=1] .963 1.07 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.02
(.069) (.091) (.070) (.051) (.056) (.055) (.059) (.064)
Poverty index 1.02 1.03    1.19***   1.08** 1.05 .975 1.02 1.00
(.042) (.052) (.048) (.035) (.036) (.031) (.036) (.042)
Household size .967    1.18***    1.11***    1.10***    1.11***    1.07***    1.11*** .992
(.030) (.040) (.028) (.021) (.022) (.021) (.024) (.023)
Mean of Dependent Variable .187 .101 .217 .485 .332 .306 .274 .807
Number of Observations 18309 17046 18634 18907 18686 18740 17648 18611
Notes: *** denotes that the odds ratio is significantly different from one at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In each column a conditional logit specification is estimated, grouped on village, where the standard errors are clustered by village, and the
log odds ratios are reported. All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviation so that the corresponding coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the continuous variable. The underlying
sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. The sample varies across the columns because villages in which all or no households have the given type of family link are dropped
when the conditional logit regression is estimated. All characteristics are measured in the third wave (October 1998) except household size which is measured at baseline. A higher household poverty index implies the household has a higher
level of permanent income and so is less poor.Table A4: Matching Algorithm and Surnames Based Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable (Columns 1 to 3): Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Omit Households With 
Potential Measurement 
Error in Surnames
Drop Villages in Top 
Quartile of Village Size
Random Reassignment of 
Households To Another Village in 
the Same Municipality
Number of Children Aged 0-16 
in Household At Baseline 
(1) (2) (3) (4a) OLS
(4b) Most Frequent 
Names
TTE [connected]    .096***    .131***    .069***
(.019) (.023) (.026)
TTE [isolated] .005 .016    .072***
(.033) (.040) (.020)
ITE [connected] -.015 .004 .016
(.031) (.040) (.043)
ITE [isolated] -.010 -.082 -.047
(.062) (.070) (.040)
Share of households with same 
head's paternal surname 
-.293 -.054
(.444) (.483)
Share of households with same 
spouse's paternal surname
.043 .329
(.473) (.489)
ΔTTE    .091***   .115** -.003
(.037) (.047) (.029)
ΔITE -.005 .086 .063
(.065) (.074) (.058)
Observations 5490 3121 5447 6227 3954
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves. Standard errors are
clustered by village in each column. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household that are full-time enrolled in school
at the time of the survey. The link variable is defined to be equal to one if household h has any family links of type j in the village, and zero otherwise. The specifications in all columns except 4a and 4b
also control for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether she speaks an
indigenous language, the household poverty index, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the village, the share of households in the village that are
eligible, the marginality index for the village, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and non eligible households. In all columns except 4a and 4b the effects of the following
controls are also allowed to vary with eligibility status, Progresa, and the interaction of the two - whether the head's (spouse's) age is above or below the median among couple headed households,
whether the head (spouse) is literate, whether the household owns land, whether the household size at baseline is above or below the median among couple headed households, and the village level
enrolment rates at the baseline among eligible and non-eligible households. In Column 1 we drop from the sample households in which the - (i) spouse's maternal surname is the same as her
husband’s; (ii) wife's paternal and maternal surnames are the same; (iii) paternal and maternal surnames of both the head and spouse are the same. In Column 2 the sample is restricted to villages
with less than 57 households in them. In Column 3 we randomly reassign each household in our baseline sample to another village within the same municipality and recalculate their extended family
links if they actually lived in that alternative village. In Columns 4a and 4b the dependent variable is the number of children aged 0-16 in the household at baseline and control for the following - the
husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous language, the household
poverty index, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, and village fixed effects. In Column 4b the sample is restricted to households in which either the head's or spouse's paternal
surname is shared by .5% of the population.Table A5: Village and Household Level Characteristics Based Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Change in Household's Secondary School Enrolment Rate (November 1999 - October 1997)
OLS regression estimates, standard errors are clustered by village
Village Interactions Household Shocks
Close to Any Health 
Facility (Less Than 5km)
No Secondary or Middle 
School in the Village
Marital History Module 
Defined Links (May 1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TTE [connected]    .095***    .095***    .111***    .114***    .095***
(.017) (.018) (.031) (.021) (.018)
TTE [isolated] .013 .010 .011 .020 -.023
(.033) (.032) (.048) (.038) (.033)
ITE [connected] -.004 -.001 -.077 -.011 -.020
(.039) (.029) (.061) (.040) (.030)
ITE [isolated] .010 .001 -.069 -.012 -.055
(.062) (.060) (.090) (.077) (.064)
ΔTTE   .083**   .086**  .100*   .094**    .118***
(.036) (.035) (.053) (.042) (.037)
ΔITE -.014 -.002 -.008 -.001 .035
(.065) (.064) (.107) (.083) (.066)
Observations 6227 6227 2118 4347 6227
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is restricted to couple headed households that can be tracked over the first and third Progresa waves.
Standard errors are clustered by village in each column. A household's secondary school enrolment rate is defined to be the fraction of children aged 11 to 16 resident in the household
that are full-time enrolled in school at the time of the survey. The link variable is defined to be equal to one if household h has any family links of type j in the village, and zero otherwise.
The specifications in all columns also control for the following - the husband's age, years of schooling, literacy, whether he speaks an indigenous language, the spouse's age, years of
schooling, literacy, whether she speaks an indigenous language, the household poverty index, the number of individuals in the household at baseline, the number of households in the
village, the share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village, regional fixed effects, and the village level enrolment rate at baseline among eligible and
non eligible households. In all columns the effects of the following controls are also allowed to vary with eligibility status, Progresa, and the interaction of the two - whether the head's
(spouse's) age is above or below the median among couple headed households, whether the head (spouse) is literate, whether the household owns land, whether the household size at
baseline is above or below the median among couple headed households, and the village level enrolment rates at the baseline among eligible and non-eligible households. In Column 1
the effects of the following village characteristics are also allowed to vary with eligibility status, Progresa, and the interaction of the two – the number of households in the village, the
share of households in the village that are eligible, the marginality index for the village, and the share of households that report being affected by any natural shocks from October 1998 to
November 1999. These shocks include being affected by droughts, floods, frosts, fires, pests, earthquakes, or hurricanes. In Column 2 we allow household responses to Progresa to vary
by whether they themselves have been affected by any shock from October 1998 to November 1999. In Column 3 the sample is restricted to villages that are less than the median
distance (5km) from any health facility as measured in November 1999 (wave 5). In Column 4 the sample is restricted to the 410 villages in which there is no secondary or middle school
present. In Column 5 we redefine the family links based on information on the presence of parental links in the village collected in the marital history module in May 1999 (wave 4).Figure A1: Propensity Scores For Connected and Isolated Households, by Eligibility Status
Figure A2: The Household Poverty Index, for Connected and Isolated Households
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Notes: In Figure A1, the propensity score for being connected is based on the following observable characteristics - the ages of the head and
spouse, dummy variables for whether they are working, literate, and speak an indigenous language, whether the household owns its home, whether
any land is owned, whether any member of the household temporarily migrated in the last year, the household poverty index, the number of male
(females) aged 0 to 5, 6 to 9, 10 to 12, 13 to 16, 17 to 29, 40 to 55, 56 and older, and regional fixed effects. For Figure A2, at baseline, households
were classified as either being eligible (poor) or non-eligible (not poor) for Progresa transfers according to a household poverty index. This index is
a weighted average of household income (excluding children), household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical
characteristics of the dwelling. The index is designed to give relatively greater weight to correlates of permanent income rather than current income.
Household Poverty Index